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COMMENTS 
GOVERNMENT REGULATION OF BANK MERGERS: THE 
REVOLVING DOOR OF PHILADELPHIA BANK 
I. SQUARE PEG IN A RouND HoLE: THE LAW AND THE FACTS 
WILLIAM H. ORRICK, JR.: Certainly there is no disputing the fact that the 
Philadelphia National Bank easel was the most important antitrust decision of the 
year and, perhaps of the decade.2 
On November 15, 1960, the second and third largest Philadelphia 
banks, the Philadelphia National Bank-its assets 1.09 billion dollars, its 
deposits 603 million dollars-and the Girard Trust Com Exchange 
Bank-its assets 757 million dollars, its deposits 560 million dollars-ap-
plied to the Comptroller of the Currency for approval to merge.8 The 
application stated the intention of the Philadelphia National (PNB) to 
acquire the Girard, including all its assets, deposits, capital, and retained 
earnings, thereupon to disgorge stock in a resulting bank to Girard share-
holders at a ratio of 1.2875 to J.-i Both Girard and PNB had a history of 
merger and acquisition. Since 1950, PNB had acquired nine formely inde-
pendent banks and Girard six, and these acquisitions had aggrandized 
the banks' asset growth to the extent of 59 and 85 percent, respectively, 
their deposit growth 63 and 91 percent, their loan growth 12 and 37 per-
cent.IS The new bank to operate under PNB's national charter would 
control 36 percent of the area bank total assets, 36 percent of deposits and 
34 percent of net loans.6 The Comptroller of the Currency, passing upon 
the merger pursuant to his authority under the Bank Merger Act of 
1960,7 took into account, inter alia, the effect of the proposed merger upon 
competition, including any tendency toward monopoly. Disregarding 
unfavorable advisory opinions from the Department of Justice, the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation, and the Federal Reserve Board, he ap-
proved the union on February 24, 1961, as in the public interest.8 On the 
1 374 U.S. 321 (1963) [hereinafter cited as principal case]. 
2 Speech before Antitrust Section, American Bar Association, by William H. Orrick, 
Jr., Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, Department of Justice, August 12, 
1963. Reported in 5 TRADE REG. REP. (1963 Trade Cas.) 1J 50.197, at 55220. 
s Figures are derived from the Government's exhibits 2 and 8 admitted in evidence at 
trial, United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 201 F. Supp. 348 (E.D. Pa. 1962). The 
deposits are those of individuals, partnerships, and corporations, as distinguished from 
those of states and municipalities. 
4 See principal case at 332. 
5 Id. at 331. 
6 Ibid. 
7 74 Stat. 129 (1960), 12 U.S.C. § 1828 (Supp. IV, 1963). 
s No opinion was rendered at that time. In his annual report to Congress, however, 
the Comptroller justified his approval on the ground that there still would be ample 
banking alternatives in Philadelphia and that the beneficial effect upon national and 
international competition would outweigh any locally anti-competitive effects. See Govern-




day following, the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice, alleging 
violation not only of section 7 but also of Sherman Act section 1,9 filed 
suit to enjoin the merger. 
The language of Clayton section 7 would seem to exclude bank mergers 
from its ambit: 
"No corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly- or 
indirectly, the whole or any part of the stock or other share capital 
and no corporation subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade 
Commission shall acquire the whole or any part of the assets of an-
other corporation engaged also in commerce, where in any line of 
commerce in any section of the country, the effect of such acquisition 
may be substantially to lessen competition, or tend to create a 
monopoly."10 
The Supreme Court settled long ago that the PNB-Girard type of merger 
is for section 7 purposes an assets acquisition.11 Further, a bank is not a 
corporation subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission.12 
Nevertheless, three years after the filing of the complaint, the Supreme 
Court in a five-to-two18 decision reversed the trial judge sitting in the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania and held that the anti-merger section of 
the Clayton Act is applicable to banks and that the Philadelphia merger 
violated that statute since, in reasonable probability, it would produce 
a substantial lessening of bank competition in the local four-county 
Philadelphia market. 
At first blush the decision would appear astounding. Prior to 1961, 
the statutory language had been interpreted to be so definite in its thrust 
that Justice had never challenged a bank merger. Indeed, the Department 
stood by in 1955 as the 831 million dollar Pennsylvania Company for 
Banking and Trusts merged with the 228 million dollar First National 
Bank of Philadelphia to form the city's largest bank. In the nation's 
financial center, New York City,, Justice took no action either in 1954, as 
the 3.4 million dollar Chemical Corn Exchange Bank absorbed the 859 
II 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1958). The Government throughout 
the case vigorously argued the applicability of the Sherman Act and relegated the Clayton 
Act to a secondary position. The Court found it unnecessary to decide the Sherman Act 
question once it found the Clayton Act violation. 
10 64 Stat. 1125 (1950), 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1958). (Emphasis added.) 
11 See Arrow-Hart 8: Hegeman Elec. Co. v. FTC, 291 U.S. 587 (1934); Swift 8: Co. v. 
FTC, decided together with FTC v. Western Meat Co., 272 U.S. 554 (1926). The PNB-
Girard merger was technically a consolidation wherein the merging entities, their assets, 
liabilities, rights, and franchises would disappear into ~e resulting bank. 
12 The FTC under§ 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 72 Stat. 1750, 15 U.S.C. 
§ 45(a)(6) (1958), has no jurisdiction over banks. 
18 Mr. Chief Justice Warren and Justices Black, Clark, and Douglas joined Mr. Justice 
Brennan, who delivered the opinion of the Court. Justices Harlan and Stewart dissented. 
Mr. Justice Goldberg wrote a memorandum in which he argued that the Clayton Act 
was inapplicable but that the merger violated the Sherman Act. Mr. Justice White took 
no part in the consideration or decision of the case. 
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million dollar New York Trust Company, or in 1959, when the 3 billion 
dollar Guaranty Trust Company fused with the 969 million dollar J. P. 
Morgan and Company. Again silent was Justice in 1957 when the Chase 
National and the Bank of the Manhattan Company joined to become the 
mighty Chase Manhattan. In effect, Justice by 1959 had thrown up its 
hands. As then Attorney General Brownell testified before the Senate 
Committee on Banking and Currency, "On the basis of these provisions 
[Sections 7 and 11 of the Clayton Act], the Department of Justice has 
concluded, and all apparently agree, that asset acquisitions by banks are 
not covered by Section 7 as amended in 1950."14 Attorney General 
Brownell, along with virtually everyone else, proved misled by the fact 
that the anti-merger statute speaks not in terms of merger, but of stock 
and asset acquisition. 
The Supreme Court in Philadelphia Bank avoided entirely the dilemma 
created by a literal construction of section 7. The Government, Mr. Justice 
Brennan reasoned for the majority, argued that the transaction was a stock 
acquisition. The banks argued it was an assets acquisition. Actually, both 
were right. The arrangement fitted neither category neatly. The transac-
tion was a merger and could be analyzed only by reference to the congres-
sional design. Construing the intendment of putatively inapplicable section 
7, the Court reasoned as follows: 
"Congress contemplated that the 1950 amendment would give § 7 a 
reach which would bring the entire range of corporate amalgamations, 
from pure stock acquisitions to pure assets acquisitions, within the scope 
of § 7. Thus, the stock acquisition and assets acquisition provisions, 
read together, reach mergers, which fit neither category perfectly but 
lie somewhere between the two ends of the spectrum.''15 
The Court then held: 
"So construed, the specific exception for acqurrmg corporations not 
subject to the FTC's jurisdiction excludes from the coverage of § 7 
only assets acquisitions by such corporations when not accomplished 
by merger.''16 
Mr. Justice Brennan's interpretation of the statutory language, while 
highly sophisticated, was suggested neither by the arguments of the Anti-
trust Division, nor by the legislative history, nor by the precedents. The 
Government in its brief and argument had so subordinated the applica-
bility of section 7 to that of Sherman Act section 1 that Mr. Justice Harlan 
in dissent was impelled to begin: "I suspect that no one will be more 
14 Hearings on the Financial Institutions Act of 1957 before a Subcommittee of the 
Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 1030 (1957). 
15 Principal case at 342. 
16 Ibid. 
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surprised than the Government to find that the Clayton Act has carried 
the day for its case in this Court."17 
Mr. Justice Harlan's comment was directed not only at the majority's 
interpretation of the statutory language. The defendants had argued that 
even if Clayton Act section 7 ever controlled bank mergers, its applicability 
had been repealed by implication in 1960 when Congress enacted the 
Bank Merger Act, which delegates to the federal banking agencies responsi-
bility for the approval of almost all bank acquisitions.18 The act prohibits 
all forms of bank merger without the consent of the Comptroller of the 
Currency if the acquiring or resulting bank is to be a national bank, of the 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System if the acquiring or 
resulting bank is to be a state member bank, or of the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation if the acquiring or resulting bank is to be a non-
member insured bank. The Comptroller, the Board, or the FDIC, as the 
case may be, is to base consent upon six factors: the financial history and 
condition of the merging banks, the adequacy of their capital structure, 
future earnings prospects, the character of management, the convenience 
and needs of the community to be served, and the effect of the transaction 
on competition (including any tendency toward monopoly). The statute 
charges the appropriate agency not to approve the application unless, after 
a consideration of all these factors, together with advisory opinions from 
the other two banking agencies and the Department of Justice, it deter-
mines that the merger is in the public interest. It was upon application of 
this six-strand public interest standard that the Comptroller approved the 
Philadelphia-Girard union.19 
The banks' argument rested upon two assumptions: first, that the 
legislative history of the Bank Merger Act clearly discloses a congressional 
apprehension that the Clayton Act is inapplicable to banks;20 second, that 
Congress, with the supposed inapplicability of section 7 in mind, delegated 
regulatory responsibility to the Comptroller and the other banking agencies. 
Therefore, the banks concluded, the Bank Merger Act is the exclusive 
mechanism created by Congress to solve the problem of adverse competitive 
consequences ensuing from bank mergers. The merit of this argument must 
be gleaned from an examination of the interrelationship between antitrust 
and direct government regulation as tools of national economic policy. 
17 Principal case at 373. 
18 64 Stat. 892 (1950), as amended, 74 Stat. 129 (1960), 12 U.S.C. § 1828 (Supp. IV, 1963). 
10 The Department of Justice and the Federal Reserve Board had strongly disapproved 
of the Philadelphia merger in advisory opinions. The FDIC, while conceding an adverse 
effect upon local competition, pointed out the pro-competitive effects upon the national 
and international markets. 
20 Compare H.R. REP. No. 1416, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1960) ("The federal antitrust 
laws are ••• inadequate to the task of regulating bank mergers; while the Attorney General 
may move against bank mergers to a limited extent under the Sherman Act, the Clayton Act 
offers little help.'), with S. REP. No. 196, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1959) ("Since bank mergers 
are customarily, if not invariably, carried out by asset acquisitions, they are exempt from 
section 7 of the Clayton Act.'). 
994 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62 
The .American economy is readily perceived as divided into two sectors-
free market and government regulated. In the predominant sector-the free 
market-individual entrepreneurial action spurred by the demands of the 
competitive process is depended upon to maximize economic growth and 
output. The antitrust laws are thought to be the guardian of this free 
market sector to assure that entry remains unrestricted, that decisions are 
independent and not collusive, and that action is competitive and not 
predatory. In this area, concentration of market power in a few entre-
preneurs or even monopoly itself has not been considered a per se antitrust 
offense. Only monopolization-the abuse of market power by practices 
clearly tending to stifle competition-has been proscribed.21 Because many 
American markets are oligopolistic rather than monopolistic in structure, 
the anti-merger statute is the most formidable weapon in the Government's 
arsenal against undue concentration of market power. And even section 7, 
it must be noted, is a weapon against future, not present market domina-
tion. 
The smaller segment of the economy, in sharp distinction, is subject 
to direct governmental control. In the so-called regulated industries, Con-
gress has entrusted administrative agencies with basic economic judgments: 
the conditions of entry into the market, the type of service to be rendered, 
the expansion or contraction of the area of enterprise, safety and insurance 
regulations, the issuance of securities, the price structure (rate making), and 
the market structure (merger, consolidation, and acquisition). Underscoring 
the distinction is the fact that a number of the so-called regulated industries 
-with power, radio, ·and television as notable exceptions-are expressly 
exempt from the antitrust laws.22 Indeed, congressional understanding that 
antitrust regulation applies principally to unregulated markets was indi-
cated by Representative Celler's remarks on the House floor in introducing 
the I 950 amendments to section 7: 
"Four companies now have 64 percent of the steel business, four 
have 82 percent of the copper business, two have 90 percent of the 
aluminum business, three have 85 percent of the automobile business, 
two have 80 percent of the electric lamp business, four have 75 percent 
of the electric refrigerator business, two have 80 percent of the glass 
business, four have 90 percent of the cigarette business and so forth. 
"The antitrust laws are a complete bust unless we pass this bill."23 
21 See, e.g., United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., ll0 F. Supp. 295, 342 (D. Mass. 
1953), afj'd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954); United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 
148 F.2d 416, 429 (2d Cir. 1945). 
22 For example, mergers approved by the CAB relieve any person affected by the 
administrative order from the operation of the antitrust laws "insofar as may be 
necessary to enable such person to do anything authorized, approved, or required by 
such order." 52 Stat. 1004 (1938), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 1384 (1958). Similar exemptions 
are provided in the Interstate Commerce Act, 54 Stat. 908 (1940), 49 U.S.C. § 5(ll) (1958), 
and the Communications Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 1070, as amended, 57 Stat. 5 (1943), 47 
u.s.c. § 222 (1958). 
23 95 CONG. REc. ll485 (1949) (remarks of Representative Geller). 
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It seems evident that Representative Celler considered the major target of 
the 1950 amendment to be further concentration by merger in the free-
market sector. It is interesting that conspicuously absent from his remarks 
was the highly concentrated banking industry. 
The Court, however, has come to regard the regulated-non-regulated 
distinction as more obvious than important. The true issue, as the Court 
has posed it, is not whether there is regulation, but whether regulation 
indicates subordination of government planning to competition as the 
economic policy controlling the particular market. The issue stated in this 
fashion had emerged from three decisions of the Court prior to Philadelphia 
Bank. While none of the three precedented the breadth of section 7 juris-
diction enunciated by Mr. Justice Brennan, all seemed to provide a basis for 
rejecting the banks' contention of implied repeal. 
In United States v. Radio Corp. of America,24 RCA and its wholly owned 
subsidiary, the National Broadcasting Company (NBC), agreed to exchange 
their Cleveland VHF television station for one in Philadelphia. Philadelphia 
represented the country's fourth largest market area; Cleveland, the tenth. 
The nature of the exchange-relinquishment then acquisition-was neces-
sitated by FCC regulations limiting NBC to five VHF stations in toto.215 
The arrangement received FCC approval, albeit over strong dissent, as in 
the "public interest, convenience and necessity," and the transaction was 
consummated. Subsequently, when the Department of Justice challenged 
the exchange, the Supreme Court held that FCC assent did not conclude 
the Government upon any antitrust issues involved in the administrative 
proceeding. FCC approval could not affect a pro tanto exemption from the 
antitrust laws. 
Although the relevant agency in RCA did not specifically consider the 
antitrust factor, this was decidedly not the case in California v. FPC.26 
There the El Paso Natural Gas Company first acquired the stock of the 
Pacific Northwest Pipeline Corporation and then sought permission of the 
FPC to swallow the assets pursuant to section 7 of the Natural Gas Act.27 
Prior to the FPC application, the Antitrust Division had brought suit 
attacking the acquisition as violative of Clayton Act section 7. Justice re-
peatedly asked the Commission to stay proceedings pending the outcome 
of the lawsuit. The FPC refused so to do, and upon continuance of the 
court proceeding, the Commission, having considered the effect upon com-
petition, went ahead to authorize the merger, which was speedily consum-
mated. The State of California intervened in the administrative proceedings 
and demanded in vain a stay pendente lite. An appeal ensued and the Su-
preme Court ultimately granted certiorari. The Court found that the natural 
gas industry, although publicly regulated, is not exempt from the operation 
2i 358 U.S. 334 (1959). 
2ts See 47 C.F.R. § 3.636 (1958). 
26 369 U.S. 482 (1962). 
27 61 Stat. 459 (1947), 15 U.S.C. § 717f(h) (1958). 
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of the antitrust laws. In an opinion by Mr. Justice Douglas the Court held 
that where a merger is challenged in the courts under the antitrust laws, 
the Commission must stay subsequently initiated administrative proceedings 
until a final judicial determination is reached. Once again the presence of 
regulatory authority failed to preclude the operation of the antitrust laws. 
The pattern of decisions indicating that administrative superintendence 
ordinarily will not pre-empt antitrust enforcement in a regulated industry 
has not been undeviated. The Supreme Court found the antitrust laws 
inapplicable in Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. United States,28 where 
the Government alleged: first, that Pan American and W. R. Grace and 
Company, each fifty percent owners of Panagra, unlawfully agreed in form-
ing the joint venture that Panagra would enjoy freedom from Pan American 
competition along the west coast of South America, while Pan American 
would remain unencumbered by Panagra competition in other areas of 
Central and South America; second, that Pan American and Grace con-
spired generally to monopolize air commerce between the United States 
and Latin America in violation of sections l, 2, and 3 of the Sherman Act. 
The Court analyzed the defendants' acts as route-fixing agreements and 
distinguished such conduct in this context from price-fixing and the monop-
olization by acquisition alleged in RCA and Calif ornia.29 It was further 
observed that the CAB, under section 411 of the Civil Aeronautics Act, 
could investigate and order stopped unfair practices or unfair methods 
of competition, including allocation of routes or other illegal combinations 
among carriers.80 Thus, where regulation is perceived to be this extensive, 
the antitrust laws are inapplicable. 
The impact the Pan American decision might have had upon Philadel-
phia Bank would at first appear far-reaching. Pan American clearly seemed 
to resolve the implied repeal issue against the Antitrust Division. But such 
niceties could not and did not present a multitude of problems to a court 
that had just found section 7 of the Clayton Act applicable to bank 
mergers. The facts in Pan American were indeed distinguishable.81 The 
CAB had continuing authority over Panagra's activities. It could issue a 
restraining order at any time. Air routes are but a creature of administrative 
discretion. They are subject to change or cancellation at the stroke of a 
pen.82 A merger, however, bears the distinction of finality. When the 
Comptroller approves, absent antitrust inquiry, the joinder is irrevocable. 
The Court, in likening the principal case to California rather than Pan 
American, took a giant step along the line of decision imposing antitrust 
policy upon the regulated industries. Mr. Justice Brennan read California 
28 371 U.S. 296 (1963). 
29 Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 296, 306 (1963). 
80 72 StaL 731, 769, 49 U.S.C. § 1381 (1958). 
31 Curiously enough, Mr. Justice Brennan, joined by Mr. Chief Justice Warren, 
dissented in Pan American. 
32 See Federal Aviation Act § 401, 72 Stat. 737 (1958), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 137l(e) 
(Supp. IV, 1963). 
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to mean that administrative approval of a merger, even where the agency, 
in passing on the merger, has taken into account the competitive factor, 
confers no immunity from Clayton Act section 7. In the context of bank 
mergers, he reasoned, the Bank Merger Act does not require the Comp~ 
troller to accord the competitive factor any particular weight. He merely 
considers it in passing, along with the other normative standards defined 
in the statute. It is clear, the Court concluded, that such a scheme of 
regulation could not have effected an implied repeal of section 7.83 Both 
jurisdictional hurdles had now been cleared. 
II. THE MERGER URGE: BANKS AND BANKERS 
MR. UNTERMYER: You are opposed to competition, are you not? 
MR. MORGAN: No, I do not mind competition. 
MR. UNTERMYER: You would rather have combination, would you not? 
MR. MORGAN: I would rather have combination ...• 
MR. UNTERMYER: Combination as against competition? 
MR. MORGAN: I do not object to competition, either. I like a little competition.34. 
The structure of commercial banking in the United States is unique. 
While commercial banking is conducted by a small number of centralized 
institutions in France or England, in the United States the industry con-
sists of thousands of separately incorporated, units. Whereas in Belgium or 
Sweden there are but a few banks with many branches, here branch bank-
ing is rarely permitted state-wide and, in any event, it almost never exceeds 
the borders of a single state. In Germany or the Netherlands, banks are 
chartered exclusively by the central government; here there is a dual bank-
ing system permitting the chartering of commercial banks by both federal 
and state authorities. 
In spite of this structural decentralization, however, commercial banks 
individually, and the system as a whole, represent vast repositories of 
economic power. Dealing in credit, the banking system has the power to 
generate demand deposit accounts amounting to approximately seventy-five 
percent of the public money supply.35 In addition to being the most im-
portant lenders to individuals, partnerships, corporations, states and munic-
ipalities, banks play other roles. They receive and administer time and 
savings deposits, engage in foreign exchange activities, execute trust 
functions, provide a source of currency to individuals and businessmen, 
render safe deposit services, and perform a variety of counseling, agency, and 
service functions.80 
Bank competition is vigorous and exists at all levels. There is competi-
tion for deposits, competition for loans, competition for trusteeships, and 
88 Principal case at 351-52. 
34. Testimony of J. P. Morgan in response to questions of Special Counsel Samuel 
Untermcyer, before the Pujo Money Trust Investigation, 62d Cong., 2d Sess. 1050 (1912). 
SIi Principal case at 374. 
so See Court Reporter's Typed Transcript at 2286, United States v. Philadelphia 
Nat'! Bank, 201 F. Supp. 348 (E.D. Pa. 1962) [hereinafter cited as Transcript]. 
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competition for counseling and foreign exchange business. The banker 
competes principally in the rendering of services, since bank prices, i.e., 
interest rates, indirectly respond to federal regulation. Minimum bank 
interest rates are virtually set by the Federal Reserve Board and, while the 
maximum is limited only by state usury laws, rate levels tend to reflect mon-
etary policies of the Board.37 With respect to loans, of course, interest rates 
represent only base price.38 Banks typically extend credit by opening 
demand deposit accounts in the borrower's name. A percentage of the total 
loan, it is stipulated, will be kept on deposit at all times. The precise loan 
percentage a bank will require to be kept on deposit, while independent 
of federal regulation, is unquestionably a price factor and influences a 
borrower's selection among competing banks. 
Notwithstanding the vigorous nature of banking competition, the 
Government has taken the attitude that bank power, if left unsupervised, 
invites revival of the naked restraints, abuses, and exclusionary practices 
exposed in the Pujo Money Trust Investigation of 1912, which led to the 
establishment of the Federal Reserve System.39 Just a half century ago, 
when Congressman Pujo's committee had occasion to investigate the con-
centration of control over money and credit, its findings disclosed that the 
processes of competition were throttled in favor of collusion, combination, 
and concentration. The committee saw widespread merger and consolida-
tion of competing banks, achieved through acquisition of competitors' 
stock by powerful interests. The committee noted the formation of con-
federations of competing banks in a system of interlocking directorates 
and recognized the influence of the more powerful banking houses in the 
management of industrial corporations. It exposed ventures undertaken by 
a few select banking houses to purchase controlling interests in mammoth 
industrial concems.40 
Today, even in spite of federal regulation, it appears that some bank 
conduct raises serious questions under traditional antitrust analysis. 
Through the expedient of the clearing house, competing bankers tend to 
"arrange" the hours of operation, the service charges to be e.xacted on 
special accounts, and the interest to be paid on time deposits.41 Competition 
from non-commercial bank sources-savings and loan associations, mutual 
37 See principal case at 328. The Federal Reserve Board exclusively fixes the rediscount 
rate at which member banks discount commercial paper. An increase in the rate means 
an increase in the costs of borrowing at the Federal Reserve by a member bank. 
Conversely, a decrease in the rate means a decrease in the cost to member banks of 
federal credit. Such changes obviously control the "prime" interest rate-the price 
member banks charge their best customers. 
38 See Transcript 1778. 
39 See note 34 supra. 
40 See Report of the House Committee To Investigate the Concentration of Control 
of Money and Credit, 62d Cong., 3d Sess. 56 (1913). 
41 See ALHADEFF, MONOPOLY AND CONCENTRATION IN BANKING 25 (1954); cf. United 
States v. Duluth Clearing House Ass'n, 5 TRADE REG. REP. (1964 Trade Cas.) 1!11 71020-22 
(D. Minn. Feb. 11, 1964). 
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savings banks, and finance companies-is severely limited. State statutes place 
severe limitations upon savings institutions. Competition afforded by finance 
companies is virtually nonexistent, not only because of rate differentials and 
service disparities, but also because finance companies derive their capital 
from commercial bank loans. It is said that the atmosphere created is a 
naturally coercive one wherein finance companies are compelled to make 
full disclosure of customers and operations to their potential competitors.42 
Antitrust inquiry into the banking industry has never been extensive. For 
example, the antitrust agencies have never inquired into bank correspondent 
relationships wherein a number of banks participate jointly in the extension 
of credit to a single customer and agree upon the rate charged and the 
terms exacted. If two shoe companies agreed to supply a purchaser with 
his total requirements-the first to supply seventy-five percent and the 
second to supply twenty-five percent, with the price fixed by mutual agree-
ment of the two companies-serious antitrust problems would unquestion-
ably be raised. Bank correspondent relationships, however, although seem-
ingly analogous, have never been so analyzed. 
The Government has nevertheless created a regulatory antidote to curb 
the unfettered excercise of monetary power by individual banks or groups 
of banks. The regulatory structure-both federal and state in origin-in 
part dates to 1819, when the Court, in McCulloch v. Maryland,43 held that 
Congress has the power to charter a bank. Regulation of banks in part 
responds to the disclosures of the 1912 Money Trust Investigation, and in 
part is the product of the bank failures of the Great Depression and the 
Rooseveltian federalism that followed. National banks, for example, are 
cl1artered and supervised by the Comptroller of the Currency. Varying state 
laws and regulations, the most important of which govern de novo branch-
ing intrastate, regulate both state and national banks at the local level. 
Most state banks, as well as all national banks, are members of the Federal 
Reserve System, the Board of Governors of which possesses broad monetary 
and fiscal powers. Federal Reserve member banks are subject to numerous 
provisions designed specifically to insure sound banking management. Illus-
trative are the rules prohibiting member banks from paying interest on 
demand deposits,44 paying interest on time or savings deposits in excess 
of the rates fixed in Washington,45 or holding for their own account invest-
ment securities of any one obligor in an amount greater than ten percent 
of the bank's unimpaired capital and surplus.46 With respect to national 
banks the ten percent limitation applies to loans as well,47 and many state 
legislatures have extended the ten percent lending limit to state-chartered 
banks. More than ninety-five percent of all banks are insured by the Federal 
42 Id. at 16. 
43 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). 
H 49 Stat. 714 (1935), 12 U.S.C. § 371a (1958). 
45 49 Stat. 715 (1935), as amended, 12 U.S.C. § 371b (Supp. IV, 1963). 
46 48 Stat. 165 (1933), 12 U.S.C. § 335 (1958). 
47 ll4 Stat. 451 (l!:106), as amended, 12 U.S.C. § 84 (1958). 
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Deposit Insurance Corporation. The principal function of the FDIC is to 
see that the public is protected by deposit insurance in the event of failure. 
From the banks' point of view, however, there runs with the benefit of 
confidence that the Government stands surety the burden of frequent and 
intensive bank inspections by federal examiners.48 
The Court in Philadelphia Bank carefully analyzed the unique nature 
of American commercial banking and the nature and extent of regulation 
by: all agencies of federal and state government. Taking into account these 
factors, it concluded that as to the banking industry, Congress, by imposing 
regulatory supervision, did not intend to displace competition and conse-
quently did not repeal applicable antitrust laws: 
"Section 7 ... does require . . . that the forces of competition be 
allowed to operate within the broad framework of governmental regula-
tion of the industry. The fact that banking is a highly regulated in-
dustry critical to the Nation's welfare makes the play of competition 
not less important but more so .... [U]nless competition is allowed to 
fulfill its role as an economic regulator in the banking industry, the 
result may well be even more governmental regulation.''49 
Congress itself had made the judgment that maintenance of competition 
was to be retained as the national policy regarding the banking industry 
when it enacted the Bank Merger Act of 1960:50 
"Vigorous competition between strong, aggressive, and sound banks 
is highly desirable. Competition in banking takes many forms-com-
petition for deposits by individuals and corporations and by personal 
and business depositors; competition for individual, business, and 
governmental loans; competition for services of various sorts. Competi-
tion for deposits increases the amounts available for loans for the 
development and growth of the Nation's industry, and commerce. 
Competition for loans gives the borrowers better terms and better service 
and furthers the development of industry and commerce. Vigorous 
competition in banking stimulates competition in the entire economy, 
industry, commerce and trade.''51 
The ultimate dilemma facing the Court in Philadelphia Bank was how 
to walk successfully the tightrope between judicial legislation-reaching a 
congressionally unintended result-on the one hand, and judicial impo-
tence-forbearance from doing justice when justice can be done-on the 
other. The desirability of applying Clayton Act proscriptions to bank merg-
ers seems evident. Banking is not sacrosanct. Absent the Court's decision, 
legislative extension to banks of Clayton Act jurisdiction would have been 
48 See 64 Stat. 882 (1950), as amended, 12 U.S.C. § 1820(b) (Supp. IV, 196!1). 
40 Principal case at 371-72. 
50 64 Stat. 892 (1950), as amended, 74 Stat. 129 (1960), 12 U.S.C. § 1828 (Supp. IV, 1963). 
51 H.R. REP. No. 1416, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1960); S. REP. No. 196, 86th Cong., 1st 
Sess. 16 (1959). 
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unlikely.152 Suppose, however, that Congress intended in 1950 to exclude 
assets acquisitions by commercial banks from the ambit of section 7, perhaps 
not because it deemed such an exclusion desirable, but because bank in-
fluence was such that this was the only way to rally the votes necessary for 
passage. Even upon this hypothesis, the tightrope remains. A Court's func-
tion is to adjudicate, not legislate. A judicial tour de force, however, is 
always most inviting.58 Remaining only is the admonition of Mr. Justice 
Brandeis: 
"When a court decides a case upon grounds of public policy, the judges 
become, in effect, legislators. The question then involved is no longer 
one for lawyers only. It seems fitting, therefore, to inquire whether 
this judicial legislation is sound."54 
So let it be inquired in Philadelphia Bank. 
III. DEBITS AND CREDITS: THE ECONOMIC RECKONING 
PHILIP PRICE: What the Department of Justice is trying to do here is not to 
enhance competition but to stifle it. It is trying to make it impossible for two banks 
here who have the energy and will to try to go out and meet competition that now 
comes from New York to try and serve the members of the business community (in 
the larger business community) . .•. 55 
As if to underscore its holding that the Clayton Act is applicable to 
bank mergers, the Court in Philadelphia Bank enunciated two legal doc-
trines which transcended the specialized factual setting of bank merger 
and dispelled some hopes that the Court's decision in Brown Shoe Co. v. 
United States56 seemed to hold for the merger defendant. The first of these 
doctrines is a prima fade presumption of unlawfulness where a merger pro-
duces a firm controlling thirty percent or more of the relevant market. The 
Court tacitly conceded the evidentiary advantage this illegality slide rule 
affords the Government: "Such a test lightens the burden of proving il-
legality only with respect to mergers whose size makes them inherently 
suspect in light of Congress' design in § 7 to prevent undue concentration."57 
While the Court's language indicates that the presumption is rebuttable 
and not conclusive, the dictum appears to contradict Brown Shoe's rule of 
52 Representative Celler in 1956 introduced another amendment to § 7 which would 
have rendered banks expressly subject to Clayton Act jurisdiction. 102 CoNG. REc. 2109 
(1956). The bill passed the House but failed in the Senate. See principal case at 396 
(dissenting opinion). 
53 Mr. Justice Harlan characterized the Court's holding as a tour de force. Principal 
case at 396 (dissenting opinion). 
54 Brandeis, Cutthroat Prices, the Competition that Kills, Harper's Weekly, Nov. 15, 
1913, p. 10. 
55 Argument sur Pleadings and Proof by Philip Price, Counsel for Girard Trust 
Com Exchange Ban1c, at 179, United States v. Philadelphia Nat'! Bank, 201 F. Supp. 
348 (E.D. Pa. 1962). 
56 370 U.S. 294 (1962). 
57 Principal case at 363. 
1002 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62 
reason test for section 7 unlawfulness: "Congress indicated plainly that a 
merger had to be functionally viewed, in the context of its particular 
industry."68 
The principal impact of the doctrine will be felt at two distinct levels 
of inquiry. In a motion for a preliminary injunction, the Government 
assumes the burden of proving, among other things, the prima fade illegal-
ity, of the challenged merger.69 Previously, prima fade illegality had been 
only nebulously defined. The Court's dictum renders these criteria some-
what ,more certain. The dictum, moreover, also alters the burden of proof 
at the trial level. In the future, where the merging firms control thirty 
percent or more of the relevant market, they will assume the burden at 
trial of rebutting the presumption of illegality. The deterrent effect of this 
principle upon future mergers is obvious. 
The presumption of illegality was not the only new doctrine the Court 
was to expound in Philadelphia Bank. An intriguing argument that had 
arisen sporadically in section 7 cases was the "better able to compete" defense. 
Defendant merging entities would try to justify any perceived anti-competi-
tive effect in the relevant market by advancing the appealing contention 
that economies and advantages of size and combination would better en-
able the merged complex to compete with industry leaders both within 
and beyond the relevant market. The doctrine was first advanced-and 
flatly rejected-in United States v. Bethlehem Steel.60 There the defendants, 
Bethlehem Steel and Youngstown Sheet and Tube, urged the court, in 
considering the competitive impact of the proposed merger, to take into 
account what they termed "certain beneficial aspects," that is, the enhance-
ment of power in the merged complex to compete effectively and vigorously 
with U.S. Steel and other industry leaders. Finding this argument untenable, 
the court said: 
"[T]he argument does not hold up as a matter of law. If the merger 
offends the statute in any relevant market, then good motives and even 
demonstrable benefits are irrelevant and afford no defense. . . . The 
consideration to be accorded to benefits of one kind or another in 
one section or another of the country which may flow from a merger 
involving a substantial lessening of competition is a matter properly to 
be urged upon Congress. It is outside the province of the Court.''61 
The "better able to compete" defense, which seemed to have been sent 
to its demise in Bethlehem-Youngstown, obtained both partial resurrection 
and some respectability in Brown Shoe. There the Supreme Court observed: 
"When concern as to the Act's breadth was expressed, supporters 
of the amendments indicated that it would not impede, for example, 
68 370 U.S. 294, 321-22 (1962). 
69 See United States v. Schine Chain Theatres, 31 F. Supp. 270 (W.D.N.Y. 1940). 
oo 168 F. Supp. 576 (S.D.N.Y. 1958). 
61 Id. at 617-18. 
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a merger between two small companies to enable the combination to 
compete more effectively with larger corporations dominating the rele-
vant market, nor a merger between a corporation which is financially 
healthy and a failing one which no longer can be a vital competitive 
factor in the market."62 
Consequently, 
"Congress foresaw that the merger of two large companies or a large and 
a small company might violate the Clayton Act while the merger of 
two small companies might not, although the share of the market fore-
closed be identical, if the purpose of the small companies is to enable 
them in combination to compete with larger corporations dominating 
the market."68 
Although the Court confined its comments to a situation involving "two 
small companies," it concluded that the Brown-Kinney merger would in 
all reasonable probability foreclose competition in a substantial share of 
the relevant market, and noted not only the presence of the unlawful effect 
but the absence of "any countervailing competitive, economic, or social 
advantages."64 This last dictum, coupled with the rationale of the "two 
small companies" doctrine, could be said to invite the very argument 
rejected in Bethlehem-Youngstown. There are countervailing economic and 
social advantages, the defendants in Philadelphia Bank could argue, and 
while there may not be "two small companies" in terms of the relevant 
market, any local lessening of competition will be more than counter-
balanced by the fact that competition will be substantially increased in the 
national and international setting. Indeed, in Philadelphia Bank the banks, 
relying on Brown Shoe, contended that, even assuming the relevant geo-
graphic market was the Philadelphia four-county area, the increased lend-
ing limit effected by the merger, together with other economies of scale, 
would better enable the merged institution to compete with larger banks 
in the New York and international markets. The Court was not impressed: 
"[I]t is suggested that the increased lending limit of the resulting bank 
will enable it to compete with the large out-of-state banks, particularly 
the New York banks, for very large loans. We reject this application 
of the concept of 'countervailing power.' ... If anti-competitive effects 
in one market could be justified by pro-competitive consequences in 
another, the logical upshot would be that every firm in an industry 
could, without violating § 7, embark on a series of mergers that would 
make it in the end as large as the industry leader."65 
The Court, attempting to harmonize its position with Brown Shoe, went 
on to qualify its pronouncement: "This is not a case, plainly, where two 
small firms in a market propose to merge in order to be able to compete 
62 370 U.S. 294, 319 (1962). 
68 Id. at 331. 
o, Id. at 334. 
61S Principal case at 370. 
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more successfully with the leading firms in that market."66 This dictum 
would appear to indicate that the "better able to compete" defense is not 
yet defunct and that it will retain some relevancy in a section 7 case where 
the merging companies are "two small firms." The Brown Shoe doctrine 
of countervailing power, however, has been narrowed in scope of applica-
tion. Naturally, one is impelled to inquire how small the firms must be. 
As to this the Court has been silent. One thing, however, seems clear. Any 
general usefulness the "better able to compete" doctrine may have afforded 
the typical merger has now been impaired. Unquestionably, however, the 
Court has preserved the "two small companies" doctrine as a narrow cor-
ridor within which certain consolidations can be justified. Philadelphia Bank 
evidently did not concern "two small companies." 
IV. NEW VoGuE IN MiscELLANEous AUTHORITY: THE R.EvoLunoN IN 
JUDICIAL NOTICE 
WILLIAM J. BRENNAN, JR.: The writing of an opinion always takes weeks and 
sometimes months. The most painstaking research and care are involved. Research, 
of course, concentrates on relevant legal materials-precedents particularly. But 
Supreme Court cases often require some familiarity with history, economics, the 
social and other sciences, and authorities in these areas, too, are consulted when 
necessary.67 
In the course of a two-month trial creating a record of some 3,900 pages, 
the Government in Philadelphia Bank offered four economists who testified 
to a variety of economic analyses indicating that the merger would, if 
consummated, not only eliminate competition between the merging institu-
tions in the Philadelphia four-county area and thereby diminish the number 
of alternative banking sources available to the small businessman, 68 but 
would also effect an increase in service charges and interest rates,69 trigger 
a renewed rash of horizontal mergers in the relevant market, 70 and culminate 
in an exportation of capital redounding to the detriment of the Philadelphia 
community, whose stream of deposits provided the banks' life blood.71 
These witnesses presumably were subjected to pre-trial examination by 
counsel for the bank. The record discloses that all were intensively cross-
examined as to their qualifications, their familiarity with the Philadelphia 
situation, and the underlying facts and assumptions which had led them to 
their conclusions. The district court, sometimes adverting to the government 
economists by name, sifted this testimony at length and rejected most of 
it.72 
The Supreme Court, however, did not mention the economic evidence 
66 Id. at 370-71. 
67 N.Y. Times, Oct. 6, 1963, § 6 (Magazine), p. 102. 
68 Transcript 1609-10, 1729, 1791, 1795. 
69 Id. at 1982-2049. 
10 Id. at 1796-97. 
71 Id. at 616-17. 
72 See United States v. Philadelphia Nat'! Barne, 201 F. Supp. 348, 367 (E.D. Pa. 1962). 
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introduced by either side; instead, it took judicial notice of economic 
sources extrinsic to the record. In the section of its opinion entitled "The 
Lawfulness of the Proposed Merger under Section 7," the Court cited the 
following economic works, among others: Bock, Mergers and Markets 
(1960); Kaysen and Turner, Antitrust Policy (1959); Hale and Hale, Market 
Power: Size and Shape Under the Sherman Act (1958); and Machlup, The 
Economics of Sellers' Competition (1956).73 
Kaysen and Turner's work received particular attention. For instance, 
the Court followed Kaysen and Turner's view of the relationship between 
quantitative market power and section 7 illegality: 
"Specifically, we think that a merger which produces a firm controlling 
an undue percentage share of the relevant market, and results in a 
significant increase in the concentration of firms in that market, is so 
inherently likely to lessen competition substantially that it must be 
enjoined ..•. 
"Furthermore, the test is fully consonant with economic theory 
[citing, inter alia, Kaysen and Turner]."74 
At another point, the Court assessed the significance of quantitative 
market power in a merger of two banks producing a single bank controlling 
over thirty percent of the commercial banking resources in the Philadelphia 
community: 
"Without attempting to specify the smallest market share which would 
still be considered to threaten undue concentration, we are clear that 
30% presents that threat [ citing, inter alia, Kaysen and Turner, who 
suggest that twenty percent should be the line of prima fade unlawful-
ness]."75 
In going on to discuss the cogency of the Kaysen and Turner analysis, 
the Court noted: "We intimate no view on the validity of such tests for we 
have no need to consider percentages smaller than those in the case at bar, 
but we note that such tests are more rigorous than is required to dispose of 
the instant case."76 
Kaysen and Turner's work advanced a "substantial legislative amend-
ment" to traditional antitrust policy.77 At the outset the authors distinguished 
specific acts of misconduct from undue market power. In their view, the 
former is a mere manifestation of the latter-the latter being the substantive 
evil to be proscribed and the more fundamental enemy of the competitive 
73 Principal case at 355 passim. The Court also cited, among others, Bok, Section 7 of 
the Clayton Act and the Merging of Law and Economics, 74 HARV. L. REv. 226, 308-16 
(1960); Markham, Merger Policy Under the New Section 7: A Six-Year Appraisal, 43 VA. 
L. REv. 489, 521-22 (1957); Stigler, Mergers and Preventive Antitrust Policy, 104 U. PA. 
L. REY. 176, 182 (1955). 
7<i Principal case at 363. 
75 Id. at 364. 
76 Id. at 364 n.41. 
77 See KAYSEN &: TURNER, ANTITRusr PoucY xl (1959). 
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process. 78 They went on to summarize their position by proposing a shift 
in legislative antitrust policy and in legislative design: "We propose •.. 
the reduction of undue market power, whether individually or jointly 
possessed; this to be done normally by dissolution, divorcement, or divesti-
ture."79 The thesis is basically this. Present antitrust policy primarily 
focuses on unreasonable restraints or practices exclusionary in economic 
effect. This policy, Kaysen and Turner contended, is wholly ineffectual in 
breaking down undue market power-the breeding ground of "conscious 
parallel action," which is the unassailable handmaiden of conspiracy. An 
examination of the American economy, the authors argued, discloses 
oligopolistic markets in which monopoly power is often effectively exercised 
with impunity. Oligopolistic markets consist of two structural subclasses: 
first, those in which the top eight firms have at least fifty percent of total 
markets sales and the top twenty firms have at least seventy-five percent of 
the total market sales; second, those where the eight largest sellers command 
a market share of thirty-three percent with the rest of the market relatively 
unconcentrated. Applying the goals of antitrust policy to the current 
American economy, the authors suggested proscription not only of conduct, 
but of excessive concentration of market power. They proposed amendments 
to the antitrust laws: first, provisions enabling a direct attack on undue 
market power regardless of the absence of conspiracy; and second, severe 
limitations upon forms of conduct contributing to or tending to contribute 
to undue market power. 
The Court's attention to extra-record economic analyses like those of 
Kaysen and Turner raises a number of interesting questions. Long before 
Philadelphia Bank, economic analysis of market behavior was considered 
relevant in merger cases as an aid in applying broad statutory language 
to a specific questioned practice. Mr. Justice Brennan, however, went a 
step further. By using economic analyses of market structure, he seemed to 
accept the thesis of some economists that certain market behavior is 
inextricably interwoven with a certain market structure, and that once the 
latter is confirmed, the former is presumed without a further factual show-
ing. The implications of this were not long in coming to light. Commissioner 
Elman of the Federal Trade Commission, in finding the recent Procter & 
Gamble-Clorox merger violative of section 7, cited a string of economic 
writings at one point and then noted: "The Supreme Court in the Philadel-
phia National Bank case by its repeated citation of economic analyses ... has 
clearly indicated the propriety of a reviewing tribunal's consideration of 
such analyses in reaching its decision in a Section 7 case."80 In spite of 
Mr. Justice Brennan's repeated use of economic sources, one may still take 
issue with Commissioner Elman's interpretation as to their propriety. The 
78 Id. at 44-45. 
79 Id. at 46. 
80 Procter & Gamble Co., 3 TRADE REG. REP. (1963 Trade Cas.) 1[ 16673, at 21568 n.19. 
(FTC Dec. 15, 1963). 
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Court in Philadelphia Bank neither used, nor needed to use, the theories 
of Kaysen and Turner or any other economists to reach its findings of 
section 7 jurisdiction or section 7 violation. Mr. Justice Brennan may have 
intended the economic analyses of market structure as a backdrop against 
which to view the merger functionally in the light of its particular industry. 
Surely Philadelphia Bank embodied the definite factual showing of illegality 
required by Brown Shoe. Nowhere did the Court intimate that the rule of 
law is now that oligopoly structure is conclusive evidence of a substantial 
lessening of competition without a further showing. With the conflicting 
inference available, one must accept with caution Commissioner Elman's 
conclusion as to the propriety of judicial economics in antitrust cases. 
Moreover, if judicial economics is now the law, surely the Court should 
restrict itself to the record or more liberally to the record and briefs of 
counsel. It does not seem unlikely that counsel for the banks, had they had 
ample warning, could have unearthed accredited economic theorists to 
take issue with the analyses of Kaysen and Turner and the others cited by 
the Court. Not forewarned, however, is to be most out of vogue. The banks' 
brief cited cases, statutes, and congressional materials but not one econ-
omist. Finally, judicial notice of an economic theory so inconsistent with 
the present policy of the antitrust laws that its proponents recommend a 
legislative amendment to effectuate its implementation seems suspect as a 
judicial tool. If new conditions indeed require that the Government add to 
its arsenal such remedial measures as direct attack on oligopoly or proscrip-
tion per se of all mergers where there will be produced an entity, controlling 
an unreasonable market share, the legislature vested with the power and 
the facilities to gather all the relevant facts must make such a judgment. 
Congress, of course, moves slowly, and it may be appropriate for the Court 
to act in compelling circumstances. If the Court makes such a judgment, 
however, it should do so openly and unequivocally. It seems strange to 
delegate the task by indirection to economists through the dubious expedi-
ent of judicial notice. 
V. JUSTICE AND THE COMPTROLLER: Two REGIMES IN THE REVOLVING DOOR 
JAMES J. SAXON: We believe it to be incumbent upon the bank supervisory agencies 
to institute studies aimed at developing proper standards to insure adequate competi-
tion in banking. It is the banking agencies alone that have the facilities, the back-
ground knowledge, the constant concern with the adequacy of banking to serve the 
financial needs of government and industry, as well as the understanding of the 
monetary and fiscal policies and problems of the nation necessary to adequate 
consideration of this matter.Bl 
The enactment of the Bank Merger Act of 1960, coupled with the 
Philadelphia Bank decision, has created an anomalous situation in public 
regulation of bank mergers. The vesting of concurrent jurisdiction over 
81 Opinion by James J. Saxon, Comptroller of the Currency, denying application to 
merge, The First National City Bank of New York and The National Bank of Westchester, 
White Plains, New York at p. 14 (Dec. 19, 1961). 
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bank mergers in a vigorous enforcement agency-the Department of 
Justice-on the one hand, and a permissive administrative agency-the 
Comptroller of the Currency-on the other, only invites the clash of two 
regimes. Manifestly, this imbroglio came to pass because Congress in 1960 
took it for granted that by nothing under the sun short of a tour de force 
could the Clayton Act be made applicable to banks.82 The result is a 
thicket of legislative intendment. The situation is further snarled by the 
Comptroller's conclusion in the recent Crocker-Anglo National Bank 
merger approval that Philadelphia Bank requires him to apply Clayton 
Act tests to merger applications under the effect-on-competition provision 
in the Bank Merger Act of 1960.83 The Court in Philadelphia Bank, how-
ever, construed one statute and one statute only in the process of finding 
illegality-section 7 of the Clayton Act. Part of the reasoning, of course, 
is that the Bank Merger Act of 1960 did not repeal by implication Clayton 
Act section 7 in directing the Comptroller to consider the competitive 
factor "in passing"-as one of six strands comprising "the public interest." 
Nowhere did the Court intimate that the Comptroller was to apply section 
7 tests under the Bank Merger Act. Nowhere did the Court intimate that, 
if the Comptroller applied such tests, banking would be thereby relieved of 
the operation of Clayton Act section 7.84 Nevertheless, the Comptroller has 
undertaken a private reading of Philadelphia Bank. Accentuating the 
problem is the fact that when the Comptroller clashes with Justice today, 
the dispute is delineated by the same standard, Clayton Act section 7. 
This was not the case prior to the Comptroller's decision in Crocker-Anglo. 
It would seem then that, from the point of view of effective government, 
the Comptroller's view of Philadelphia Bank can only be an apple of 
discord. 
The Comptroller of the Currency traditionally has taken a permissive 
attitude toward bank mergers. At trial in Philadelphia Bank a former acting 
Comptroller testified that between 1950 and 1959 his office received approxi-
mately 840 merger applications and denied "only a few" because of their 
adverse effect upon competition.85 In recent years the number of mergers 
approved by the Comptroller has burgeoned. The Comptroller in 1961 ap-
proved seventy-two mergers. In 1962, with the incumbent Comptroller, James 
J. Saxon, firmly at the helm in the Treasury Building, the figure soared to 
ll0 approvals out of US applications. As of June 28, 1963, Mr. Saxon had 
approved 35 applications and disapproved one, with 27 pending.86 He 
82 See note 53 supra. 
83 See Decision of the Comptroller on the Application to Merge Crocker-Anglo 
National Bank, San Francisco, California with Citizens National Bank, Los Angeles, 
California. Sept. 30, 1963. 
84 Indeed, in California v. FPC, 369 U.S. 482 (1962), the Court clearly indicated other-
wise. 
85 Testimony of Lewellyn A. Jennings. Transcript, 3405-07. 
86 These data have been culled from official reports of the Comptroller of the 
Currency. For further statistics see Appendix. 
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consistently has refused to deny a merger application solely on the basis of 
the competitive factor even in cases where concentration approaches 
Sherman Act dimensions.87 The Comptroller's permissive merger policy can 
be viewed only as part of a general scheme of bank regulation. Mr. Saxon, 
for example, has evoked considerable criticism from state bankers for his 
liberal propensity to grant national bank charters, as well as his advocacy of 
special legislation enabling national banks to branch state-wide regardless of 
local law.88 This trifurcated policy of permissiveness can admit of but one 
underlying meaning. The Comptroller wants to spur the entry of an increas-
ing number of banks chartered under the federal roof. Once the banks are in, 
he wants them to be institutions of great strength, the only check on their 
power being his own regulatory authority. This he proposes to effect by al-
lowing easy entry, ease of expansion by de novo branching, and ease of growth 
by merger or acquisition. This stand is buttressed by the jurisdictional 
language of the Bank Merger Act. The consent to merge is within the 
jurisdiction of the Comptroller if and only if the resulting bank is a 
national bank. 
The Comptroller can justify his attempt to expand his regulatory power 
by an appealing economic and administrative argument. Banking, as noted 
earlier, is a heavily regulated industry. This provides the basis for a salient 
economic distinction. One of the Comptroller's chief economists has con-
tended: 
"The antitrust laws are an integral part of a public policy which 
places essential reliance upon private decision making. . . . In the 
regulated industry of banking the reverse is true. Public intercession 
in the decision making process takes place at each stage of bank forma-
tion and expansion through branching or merger. Private entrepreneurs 
are not permitted to enter the banking industry without the consent 
of the public authorities. Where they are allowed to enter, they may 
branch or merge only with the approval of the public authorities."89 
The thesis is thus developed. The market structure itself is under the 
exclusive aegis of the regulator and is not determined by decisions of 
individual entrepreneurs. Therefore, it is misleading and erroneous to speak 
of competition in an antitrust sense within the context of the regulated 
banking industry. The degree of competition, indeed the very market 
structure, is a creature of state planning and, as such, should not be 
cognizable under Clayton Act tests. 
87 See, e.g., Denial of Application To Merge The First National City Bank of New York 
and The National Bank of Westchester, White Plains 14-24 (Dec. 19, 1961). 
88 See N.Y. Times, Oct. 3, 1963, p. 47, col. 5, where Norris E. Hartwell, President 
of the National Association of Supervisors of State Banks, criticizes the Comptroller's 
policies and charges that the Comptroller does the bidding of the banks he regulates. 
80 Abramson, Private Competition and Public Regulation, National Banking Rev. 
Sept. 1963, pp. 101-02. Mr. Abramson is the Director, Department of Banking and 
Economic Research, Comptroller of the Currency. 
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The Supreme Court, however, has spoken in Philadelphia Bank. As the 
Comptroller understands the decision, his duty is to apply Clayton Act 
tests under the Bank Merger Act. This, however, will not change basic 
merger policy, for the Comptroller is not the Department of Justice. 
Justice's duty is to bring all the lawsuits its facilities will allow, to test the 
"outer limits" of the antitrust laws, and to press for their applicability to 
any and all new industries and situations where the courts might decide 
that competition is endangered unlawfully. Of course, the Comptroller 
will not read Philadelphia Bank as divesting him of jurisdiction over the 
competitive consequences of a given merger, but instead will continue to 
fulfill his statutory duty to pass upon merger applications. 
Justice would take a diametrically opposite view. The Comptroller, it 
is argued, is not really the exclusive regulator of entry into the industry. 
To begin with, for the nonce at least, entry is regulated by state authority 
as well. Besides, regulation does not fully displace individual initiative. 
The Comptroller indeed holds veto power, and while it is conceded that 
he may block entry, no policy of permissiveness, however promulgated, will 
spur individual entrepreneurs to enter a market in which merger has created 
undue concentration. The Comptroller has conceded his own impotence 
with respect to stimulation of market entry. Testifying before the House 
Committee on Banking and Currency hearings on the conflict of federal 
and state banking laws, he said: 
"There is one broad area, however, in which the initiative has had 
to rest primarily with the banks themselves. This area concerns the 
competitive conditions which will prevail in the banking industry. 
We have the authority to pass upon applications for new national 
charters, for the establishment of new branches by national banks, and 
for the merger of existing institutions. But we do not have, nor do we 
seek, the authority to initiate such applications."90 
Entry, the Comptroller has correctly stated, is not a creature of regulatory 
authority, as his economists claim; it is entirely dependent upon the 
existence of a market amenable to further competition. Whether there is 
to be entry rests upon private decision. I£ there is to be any opportunity 
for entry, competition in an antitrust sense must be preserved. The Comp-
troller may apply Clayton Act tests under the Bank Merger Act. Surely 
there is nothing in RCA or California which suggests he may not so do. But 
in California the Court clearly stated that the ultimate administration of 
the antitrust laws is exclusively vested in the courts: "Our function is to 
see that the policy entrusted to the courts is not frustrated by an adminis-
trative agency."91 I£ the Comptroller continues an attitude of permissive-
90 Statement of James J. Saxon, Comptroller of the Currency, to Hearings Before the 
House Committee on Banking and Currency, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 275 (196!1). 
91 California v. FPC, !169 U.S. 482, 490 (1962). 
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ness, notwithstanding his application of Clayton Act tests, complaints will 
issue from the Antitrust Division.92 
While the clash between Justice and the Comptroller has yet to 
produce a victor, it has conceived two minor skirmishes, neither of which 
appears to have affected the existing stalemate. On August 9, 1963, the 
Comptroller approved the merger of the 48.3 million dollar Calumet 
National Bank of Hammond, Indiana, and the 42.9 million dollar Mercantile 
National Bank, also of Hammond.93 Calumet was the largest bank in 
Hammond, with 43 percent of the deposits and 37 percent of the loans; 
Mercantile, the second largest, with 37 percent of the deposits and 44 percent 
of the loans. The merged bank would have over 80 percent of Hammond's 
commercial banking business. In analyzing the competitive factor under 
section 7, the Comptroller produced an interesting piece of legal legerde-
main. Philadelphia Bank, he reasoned, determined that section 7 applies 
to bank mergers. Philadelphia Bank relied upon Brown Shoe. Quoting 
Brown Shoe, the Comptroller stated: 
"[T]hat 'Congress recognized the stimulation to competition that might 
flow from particular mergers' and ..• 'Congress foresaw that the merger 
of two large companies or a large and a small company might violate 
the Clayton Act while the merger of two small companies might not ... 
if the purpose of the small companies is to enable them in combination 
to compete with larger corporations dominating the market.' The 
instant merger is just such a case."94 
The Comptroller seems to have forgotten that the Court in Philadelphia 
Bank narrowly interpreted this Brown Shoe doctrine.95 Justice, however, 
had a better memory. On October 10, 1963, the Attorney-General filed a 
complaint in the Northern District of Indiana alleging that the merger 
violated not only section 7, but also Sherman Act section I.96 Shortly 
thereafter the banks abandoned their plan to merge.97 
Justice, however, has not always triumphed. On May 13, 1963, Crocker-
Anglo National Bank of San Francisco, fifth largest in California, with 
2.3 billion dollars in assets, and Citizens National Bank, Los Angeles, sixth 
largest with 775 million dollars, sought the Comptroller's consent to merge. 
California is a unique banking state. State-wide branch banking is per-
mitted and practiced. Concentration since the mid-1930's has been unusually 
high, with the largest bank holding 39.5 percent of the deposits in the state, 
the three largest, 63.5 percent, and the five largest, 78.6 percent. Crocker-
92 The representations herein of the views of the Comptroller and the Department 
of Justice are based on a series of interviews the author had with officials in both 
departments, Nov. 5-7, 1963. 
03 See Decision of the Comptroller, Aug. 9, 1963. 
94 Id. at 5. 
95 See discussion of countervailing power in Part III supra. 
96 See 5 TRADE REG. REP. (1963 Trade Cas.) 1J 45063 (N.D. Ind. Oct. IO, 1963). 
117 See N.Y. Times, Oct. 23, 1963, p. 65, col. 3. 
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Anglo controlled 7.2 percent of the deposits; Citizens National, 2.5 percent. 
The merged complex would be fourth in the state; it would control 9.7 
percent of the banking resources in California. The case presented an 
interesting question under the Clayton Act, since the two banks, although 
both within California, did not have offices or branches in the same 
counties. Citizens National had 78 banking offices in five southern California 
counties. Crocker-Anglo had 124 banking offices in 29 counties sweeping 
from northernmost Siskiyou County to southern Santa Barbara County, 
over four hundred miles away. Three Citizens National counties-Ventura, 
Los Angeles, and San Bernadina-are contiguous to three Crocker-Anglo 
counties-Santa Barbara, San Luis Obispo, and Kem-with the nearest 
offices of the merging banks less than 50 miles apart. At the hearing before 
the Comptroller it was adduced that the banks had 140 common depositors. 
In passing on the merger, the Comptroller was quick to distinguish 
the Crocker-Anglo case from the competitive situation in Philadelphia Bank. 
In Philadelphia Bank, competition between the merging institutions was 
real and direct; in Crocker-Anglo, competition was inchoate and potential 
only. Philadelphia and Girard were respectively second and third in the 
relevant market; Crocker-Anglo and Citizens were fifth and sixth. Phila-
delphia and Girard were situated in close proximity and operated their 
branches in a contiguous four-county area; Crocker-Anglo and Citizens 
maintained their principal offices in different cities over 400 miles apart. 
The merger, the Comptroller concluded, would not foreclose banking 
alternatives to the small borrower or depositor. Its consummation would be 
in the public interest. The application was approved September 30, 1963.98 
On October 8, 1963, the Department of Justice sought to enjoin the 
merger.99 Justice proceeded upon three theories: first, the merged complex 
would amass vastly increased resources, thereby redounding to the detriment 
of the banks' smaller competitors; second, actual and potential competition 
between Crocker-Anglo and Citizens would be eliminated in that, but for 
the merger, Crocker-Anglo would branch southward and compete with 
Citizens National for the rich deposit preserves of the populous San 
Joaquin Valley; third, competition in California commercial banking would 
be substantially lessened. On November 1, 1963, a three-judge district court, 
in a per curiam opinion, denied the Government's motion for a preliminary 
injunction during pendency.100 The court, like the Comptroller, dis-
tinguished the market situation from that of Philadelphia Bank. The court 
reasoned that the actual competition involving each bank is with other 
banks and not inter se, as was the case in Philadelphia Bank. The Govern-
ment's "foreclosure of potential competition" theory, it was determined, 
is not tenable in that local conditions suggested no reasonable probability 
that, but for the merger, Crocker-Anglo would branch south of the 
98 See note 83 supra. 
99 See 5 TRADE REG. REP. (1963 Trade Cas.) ,f 45063 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 8, 1963). 
100 See 5 TRADE REG. REP. (1963 Trade Cas.) ,f 70934 (N.D. Cal. Nov. I, 1963). 
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Tehachapi Mountains to compete with Citizens National.101 Upon the 
denial of the preliminary injunction the banks consummated the merger.102 
The Government has announced it will go to trial on the merits, perhaps 
with the additional burden of asking the court to design a remedy which 
will unscramble the omelet and at the same time restore the competitive 
situation as it existed prior to consummation. 
At trial the government will face the problem of producing a specific 
theory to support its broad allegations. It appears possible, for example, 
to argue that the merger will result in a substantial potential "vertical 
foreclosure" of other banks in the relevant market. National banks, as 
previously pointed out, are limited in the amount they can lend any one 
obligor to a sum equal to IO percent of unimpaired capital and surplus.103 
When a borrower seeks funds in excess of the lending limit, and sometimes 
even where this is not the case, the originating bank arranges a lending 
participation with correspondent banks-sometimes as many as 14 or 15-
who assume the risk pro tanto and extend the loan. As of February 28, 1963, 
Citizens National, the smaller bank, had unimpaired capital and surplus of 
46.5 million dollars. This means that the bank's lending limit was approxi-
mately 4.6 million dollars. The Government may be able to marshal facts 
disclosing that Citizens National typically entered into a substantial number 
of correspondent relationships with other California banks competing 
directly with Crocker-Anglo for such participations. The merger, it might 
be demonstrated, would foreclose these banks because, by virtue of the 
increased lending limit and enlarged sphere of geographical influence effected 
by the merger, the merged entity would no longer enter into such participa-
tions. In other words, by swallowing Citizens National, Crocker-Anglo 
potentially will cease to compete with other California banks for correspond-
ent relationships. The same argument is equally applicable to competitors 
of Citizens National who, but for the merger, would be correspondents of 
Crocker-Anglo. In view of Crocker-Anglo's already high lending limit of 
14.8 million dollars, however, such foreclosure may not be substantial. 
Whether there is evidence of a substantial number of such "vertical" par-
ticipations so as to sustain the argument, is a question that can be resolved 
only at trial.104 The problem for the merged bank is that the denial of the 
preliminary injunction hardly ends the uncertainty of doing business during 
pendency of trial on the merits. 
• • • 
It seems that of all the controversial effects flowing from the Philadelphia 
Bank decision, the conflict between Justice and the Comptroller is the least 
101 Id. at 78723. 
102 See Fortune, Dec. 1963, p. 217. 
103 See note 46 supra. 
104 In approving the merger the Comptroller considered the probable anti-competitive 
effects on correspondent relationships of the merging banks, but he dismissed such effects 
as insubstantial. Decision of the Comptroller on the Application To Merge Crocker-Anglo 
National Bank, San Francisco, California with Citizens National Bank, Los Angeles, 
California, Sept. 30, 1963. 
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salutary. The applicability of section 7, while it may not be good law, seems 
to be sound policy. The birth of the thirty percent presumption of illegality 
and the neutralization of the "better able to compete" defense of counter-
vailing power seem rules of convenience designed to reduce unnecessary 
protraction of a trial without impairing consideration of all relevant factors. 
The supervention of the antitrust laws upon administrative approval based 
upon a vague public interest standard has support in Supreme Court 
precedent. To rule otherwise is to invite a lack of harmonization in the 
accommodation of two sets of laws. The Court's decision, however, should 
certainly not be taken to mean that, if the Comptroller applies Clayton 
Act tests and approves the merger, the transaction deserves less scrupulous 
scrutiny from the judge. 
Philadelphia Bank, even its opponents will concede, was a decision that 
addressed itself to the future. The Department of Justice may easily accept 
the decision as a mandate for more vigorous enforcement of section 7. 
Justice and the FTC may read the Court's opinion as an invitation to test 
new situations under the expanded jurisdiction of section 7.105 Philadelphia 
Bank in conjunction with Brown Shoe may well invite antitrust scrutiny of 
correspondent relationships and loan participations where banks separated 
geographically like Crock.er-Anglo and Citizens National seek to merge. 
However, the decision, because decided under Clayton Act section 7, should 
not preclude a test of bank mergers under Sherman Act section I.106 
Finally, the decision should stimulate the legislator and the administrator 
to coordinate regulatory policy with the prosecution of the antitrust laws. 
For, as Philadelphia Bank and subsequent cases so clearly demonstrate, the 
statutory thick.et regulating the banking industry has become so dense that 
the situation merits re-examination and reappraisal by the Congress. 
James D. Zirin 
APPENDIX 
THE MERGER PICTURE, 1962-63 
I. Summary of Comptroller's decisions on bank merger applications. Data is taken from 
1963, 1964 COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY ANN. REP. 
A. Mergers: January I, 1962-December 31, 1962 
Approved by Comptroller . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . 110 
Denied by Comptroller . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 
Withdrawn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . • 1 
B. Mergers: January 1, 1963-June 28, 1963 
Applications 
.~pplications pending as of January 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • • . . . . . . . . . . • 16 
Applications received . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • • . . . . • 48 
Total •....................... • • •· .. • •·· • - . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. .. . . . . . . . . . ... . 64 
105 See Procter &: Gamble Co., 3 TRADE REc. REP. (1963 Trade Cas.) ,i 16673 (FTC 
Dec. 15, 1963). 
106 See, e.g., United States v. First Nat'l Bank &: Trust Co., probable jurisdiction 
noted, 374 U.S. 824 (1963). 
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Disposition 
Approved • . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . 35 
Disapproved • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • • . • • . • • . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . 1 
Withdrawn • • . • • • . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 
Pending • . •• •• •• . . . . .. . . .• . • . • .. •• .. . . .. ..•... .. .. . . . .. .. . .. . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 
Total •. . .•• .. • . .•. . •• .. .. . . . .•• . . • . . .• . •. .• . .. . . . . . . ... .••.•.... .. . . ••. . .. .. 64 
II. The following are tabular representations of the comments of the Department of 
Justice, the Federal Reserve Board, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation on 
bank absorption applications passed on by the Comptroller of the Currency in 1962. The 
terminology is that of the individual agencies. Data is taken from 1963 COMPTROLLER OF 
THE CtnulENCY ANN. REP. 
A. Department of Justice 
1. Favorable ...•...........•.............................•.............. 
2. No adverse effect .....•......••....•.....................••........•.• 
3. Not substantially adverse •...•........•................................ 
4. Slightly adverse .......•.•..•........•......•..•........•...••..•...•• 
5. Adverse effect ••..•••.....•..•.....•..•.•...............•...••.....•.• 
6. Significantly adverse •...••.••..•...•....•...............•....•....••.. 
7. Substantially adverse •••••••.••••••..•..••••.•......................... 
8. Substantially adverse and serious anti-competitive effect •.....•......... 
9. Threat of litigation •....•••...••................................•..... 
Total .....................••..........•.........................•. 
B. Federal Reserve Board 
1. Will increase competition •.•.............•............................ 
2. May increase competition ••......••..............................••••. 
(with caveat of trend toward concentration) ..........•................. 
3. No adverse effect on competition .•.................................... 
(with caveat of trend toward concentration) ........................... . 
4. No serious adverse effect on competition ........................•...•... 
(with caveat of trend toward concentration) ....•••.................•.•• 
5. Will have little adverse effect on competition ..........................• 
(with caveat of trend toward concentration) .•..............•..•........ 
6. Probably no adverse effect on competition •............................ 
7. Might have adverse effect on two parties involved ..................... . 
8. Might have adverse effect on competition .................•............ 
(with caveat of trend toward concentration) ........•..................• 
9. Will eliminate competition between two banks, exposing remaining banks 
to greater competition •.•..•.••....•...............•.............. 
{with caveat of trend toward concentration) ..•.••.....•...•...•........ 
10. Will eliminate some competition ••............•.•...............•....• 
(with caveat of trend toward concentration) ...........................• 
11. Will eliminate substantial competition ............•................... 
(with caveat of trend toward concentration) .....•.••.............•....• 
12, Will have adverse effect on competition •••••.......................•... 
13. Will eliminate present and potential competition .•...•............•..•• 
(with caveat of trend toward concentration) .................•.......... 













































1016 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62 
C. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
I. Enhancement of competition • • • . . . • . • . • . • . • . • . . • . . • • • • • . • • . . • . • • • • . . • • 1 
2. Overall effect on competition would not be unfavorable . . • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 102 
3. No effect on competition • • . • • • • • • • . • • • . • • . . • . • • . . • • • • • . • • • . • • • • • • • • • • • 2 
4. No adverse effect on competition • • • . • • . • • • . • . • • • . • . . • . . • • • . . • • • . • • • • • • 1 
5. Appears unfavorable • • • . . . . • . . . . • . • . . • . . • • . . • • • • • . . • . • • • • • • • . • • • • • • • • • 1 
6. Effect would be unfavorable • • • . • . • • • • • • • . • . . • . • . • . • • • . . • • • • • • • • • • . . • . • 8 
Total.............................................................. 115 
TRANSFER OF OPERATING RIGHTS 
Traditional public utilities have certain economic characteristics which 
engender the creation of monopoly franchises and the imposition of 
stringent economic regulation. Such enterprises have a "natural monop-
oly."1 That is, the technology of the industry is such that unregulated com-
petition will lead to the establishment of a single enterprise in a given 
market. These industries are characterized by huge capital investment, the 
allocated cost of which is large in proportion to the total costs of produc-
tion. Plant and equipment are highly specialized as to function and use. 
Because of economies of scale, service may be provided at a decreasing unit 
cost for greater volume of output up to the total demand in the market. In 
competition, the firm with the lowest unit costs will lower rates to a point 
at which competitors will be forced to cease operations in order to minimize 
losses. Thus, competition is inevitably destructive in such cases. Entry of 
new firms is discouraged by the high cost of entry and the danger of loss of 
the specialized equipment and plant. In such industries the grant of a 
monopoly franchise by the government leads to orderly construction of 
facilities; ideally, government regulation of the monopoly firm also pro-
tects consumers. 
Not all industries under regulation by government bodies fit this de-
scription, nor are all treated as monopolies. Neither air carriers under the 
jurisdiction of the Civil Aeronautics Board,2 nor motor carriers of property 
under the jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce Commission,3 nor radio 
and television broadcasting stations under the jurisdiction of the Federal 
Communications Commission4 conform to the monopoly model. Generally 
l See generally BONBRIGHT, PUBLIC UTILITY RATES 10-13 (1961). 
2 There are some economies of scale in air transport, but they fall far short of the 
economies of scale in a traditional utility. See CAVES, AIR TRANSPORT AND ITS REGULATORS 
55-83 (1962); FULDA, COMPETITION IN THE REGULATED INDUSTRIES: TRANSPORTATION 17-19 
(1961); MEYER, PECK, STENASON &: ZWICK, COMPETffiON IN THE TRANSPORTATION INDUSTRIES 
228 (1960). 
3 Motor trucking is generally thought to have no significant economies of scale. See 
FULDA, op. cit. supra note 2, at 9-11; MEYER, PECK, STENASON &: ZWICK, op. cit. supra note 
2, at 94-97; Pegrum, The Economic Basis of Public Policy for Motor Transport, 28 LAND 
EcoN. 244 (1952). Because of considerations peculiar to the carriage of passengers, regula-
tion of passenger carriers will not be considered in this comment 
4 Classification of the broa~casting in~ustry has been difficult. See BoNBRIGHT, op. cit. 
supra note 1, at 3. But, assuming the ex.istence of networks, there are no operating cost 
advantages to be derived from ownership of more than one station. 
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the business units in these industries face significant competition both from 
other members of the same industry in the same market and from members 
of other industries which provide substitutable services. Yet entry of new 
competitors is limited, to a greater or lesser degree, by the government 
agency which regulates the industry.5 
The economic regulation of the CAB extends to all air carriers engaged 
in interstate air transportation. No enterprise can operate as a common 
carrier of passengers or property for hire across state lines without Board 
authorization.6 The requirement of authorization is enforced by both civil 
and criminal sanctions.7 Thus entry into the business of interstate air car-
riage-and geographical expansion of such an existing business-is limited 
by government control as well as by economic forces. Similarly, motor car-
riers, to engage in interstate operations, must have a valid authorization 
issued by the ICC,8 and commercial radio and television stations can broad-
cast only with permission of the FCC.9 Necessary licenses, permits, or cer-
tificates can be obtained through original grant or by transfer from the 
holder of an existing certificate. This comment will consider the policies 
of the FCC, the ICC, and CAB regarding the transfer of rights to operate 
within their respective jurisdictions. 
I. TRANSFER OF BROADCASTING STATION LICENSES 
There is an active market in transfers of rights to operate broadcasting 
stations. The absolute number of transfers which come before the FCC for 
approval each year and the number of transfers as a percentage of all sta-
tions are high and have been so for a number of years.10 Many of these 
transfers involve substantial consideration, often considerably in excess of 
the value of the physical properties transferred_ll More than thirty brokers 
5 See generally FULDA, op. cit. supra note 2; Hale&: Hale, Competition or Control III: 
Motor Carriers, 108 U. PA. L. REv. 775 (1960); Hale &: Hale, Competition or Control II: 
Radio and Television Broadcasting, 107 U. PA. L. REv. 585 (1959). 
6 Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 40l(a), 72 Stat. 758, 49 U.S.C. § 137I(a) (1958). Under 
§ 416 the Board has the power to classify and exempt air carriers. 72 Stat. 771, 49 U.S.C. 
§ 1386 (1958). 
7 See Federal Aviation Act of 1958, §§ 902, 1007, 72 Stat. 784, 796, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1472, 
1487 (1958). 
B Motor Carrier Act § 203(c), 49 Stat. 544 (1935), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 303(c) (1958). 
9 Communications Act of 1934, § 301, 48 Stat. 1081, 47 U.S.C. § 301 (1958). 
10 The number of applications for transfers of AM, FM, TV, and auxiliary stations has 
not been less than one thousand in any year since 1955. See 19-28 FCC ANN. REPs. (1953-
1962). Those involving substantial consideration are probably few more than half of the 
total. See EM.ERY, BROADCASrING AND GOVERNMENT 467 (1961). The number of station trans-
fers each year is about 20% of the total number of licenses outstanding. See 23 P &: F 
RAmo REcs. 1503, 1516 (1962) (report and order of the FCC adding "trafficking" regula-
tions). 
11 In 1962, a New York City AM station was sold for $10.9 million, and a half-interest 
in a Pittsburgh television station for $10.6 million. 28 FCC ANN. REP. 56 (1962). Average 
prices are somewhat less. See EMERY, op. cit. supra note 10, at 467; Broadcasting, Feb. 15, 
1960, p. 80. However, television station facilities cost only from 250 thousand to one million 
dollars to construct. FCC Network Study Staff, Network Broadcasting, H.R. REP. No. 1297, 
85th Cong., 2d Sess. 46 (1958) [hereinafter cited as Network Broadcasting Report]. 
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are actively engaged in soliciting purchases and sales of such operating 
licenses.12 
A. Statutory Standards for License Transfers 
Section 310(b) of the Communications Act of 193413 forbids transfers of 
station licenses except upon a finding by the FCC that the "public interest, 
convenience, and necessity" will be served thereby. A 1952 amendment to 
the section forecloses consideration by the Commission of whether the 
public interest would be better served by a transfer to a person other than 
the proposed transferee.14 The purpose of the amendment was to eliminate 
the so-called AVCO rule, which provided for a comparative hearing before 
the FCC involving all qualified applicants prepared to meet the proposed 
transferor's terms of contract.15 Repeal of this amendment has been urged 
by the FCC, although apparently not with the intention of reviving the 
AVCO rule.16 Legislative proposals to repeal this amendment to 310(b) 
have not been successful.17 
B. FCC Policy Regarding License Transfers 
The FCC has long been wrestling with the problem of evolving stand-
ards to govern the transfer of certificates. Foreclosed by the statute from 
requiring a comparative hearing on transfer applications, the Commission 
rarely has formal hearings of any type on transfers.18 Assuming that the 
prospective transferee meets minimum citizenship, character, financial, and 
technical qualifications, a propo~ed transfer is generally approved without 
serious objection.19 The sale price is not important in determining the 
12 Broadcasting, Feb. 15, 1960, p. 80. 
13 48 Stat. 1086 (1934), as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 310(b) (1958). 
14 66 Stat. 716 (1952). 
15 S. REP. No. 44, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 8-9 (1951). The FCC had already repealed the 
AVCO rule in 1949. 14 Fed. Reg. 3235 (1949). The AVCO rule got its name from Powel 
Crosley, Jr., 11 F.C.C. 3 (1945), which involved The Aviation Corporation as transferee 
of the rights in question. 
16 Letter and Enclosed Statement from Chairman E. William Henry to Speaker John 
W. McCormack, June 27, 1963, in I P 8: F RADIO R.Ecs. 10-71. Without wishing to reinstate 
the AVCO rule, the FCC wants more flexibility to deal with transfer problems. 
17 Neither H.R. 11340, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960), nor H.R. 1165, 87th Cong., 1st 
Sess. (1961), was reported out of committee. 
18 Seven proposed transfers (five involving FM stations) reached hearing in fiscal 
1962. 28 FCC ANN. REP. 20 (1962). None reached hearing in fiscal 1961. 27 FCC ANN. REP. 
18 (1961). The latter is probably a more typical year. See Hearings Before the Antitrust 
Subcommittee of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 22, pt. 
2, vol. I, at 3228-30 (1957) (Chairman Mcconnaughey testifying that hearings on trans-
fers and sales are almost nonexistent). 
19 Section 310(b), governing transfers, states that the Commission shall dispose of the 
application as if the proposed transferee were making application under § 308 for an 
original license. Communications Act of 1934, § 310(b), 48 Stat. 1086, as amended, 47 
U.S.C. § 310(b) (1958). Section 308(b) instructs the Commission to consider the citizenship, 
character, financial, and technical qualifications of the applicant. 48 Stat. 1086 (1934), 
as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 308(b) (1958); see § 319(a), 48 Stat. 1087 (1934), as amended, 
47 U.S.C. § 319(a) (1958). 
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legality of the transfer, regardless of its relationship to the value of the 
physical property involved.20 All the energies of the Commission have been 
directed at the problem of so-called "trafficking" in licenses-basically, the 
practice of procuring licenses for the purpose of sale at a profit.21 The 
efforts devoted to this problem have diverted attention from more impor-
tant issues raised by FCC policy. 
C. Competition in the Broadcasting Industry 
There is available only a limited number of television stations of com-
mercial importance. From 1948 to 1952, the FCC "froze" television authori-
zations in order to devise a master plan for the allocation of television 
broadcasting frequencies.22 By the time the freeze was lifted, the FCC had 
set aside for commercial television purposes far more channels on the UHF 
portion of the band than on the VHF portion.23 However, by 1952 VHF 
had achieved great competitive advantages. No UHF station had been com-
mercially broadcasting, and the viewing public had in its hands more than 
seventeen million television sets incapable of receiving UHF signals.24 In 
addition, UHF has a slightly shorter range of transmission than VHF, al-
though the picture received is equally good.25 Advertisers, of course, prefer 
to patronize stations which reach wider audiences, and thus the commercial 
significance of UHF stations has been stunted. Although much lamented, 
the situation is unlikely to be improved markedly in the near future.26 
20 See, e.g., Wrather-Alvarez, Inc., 10 P 8: F RADIO REcs. 539 (1953); Edward J. 
Noble, 11 F.C.C. 569 (1946). 
21 In addition to concern long expressed by the FCC, criticism of trafficking has 
come from congressional sources as well as others. H.R. REP. No. 1258, 86th Cong., 2d 
Sess. 39-40 (1960); H.R. REP. No. 2711, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 39 (1959); Hearings on the 
Investigation of Regulatory Commissions and Agencies Before a Subcommittee of the House 
Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 8, at 2908-90 
(1958); Note, 30 IND. L.J. 351 (1955). These sentiments led to promulgation in 1962 by the 
FCC of special rules aimed at curbing transfers of certificates that have been procured 
for the purpose of sale. With certain exceptions, a formal hearing is required in every case 
with respect to application for consent to the transfer of the license of a station which 
bas been operated by the proposed transferor for less than three years. 47 C.F.R. § 1.365 
(Cum. Supp. 1963). The principal exceptions are for death, disability, unavailability of 
capital, or other changed circumstances. 47 C.F.R. § 1.365(a)(3) (Cum. Supp. 1963). 
Presumably the purpose of the hearing will be determination of the motive of the 
transferor in acquiring the license, and, if the motive is sale or resale, the application for 
transfer will be denied. 
22 13 Fed. Reg. 5860 (1948) (the "freeze" order); 17 Fed. Reg. 3905 (1952) (lifting the 
"freeze'). See generally Note, 75 HARv. L. REv. 1578 (1962). 
23 Seventy of the eighty-two channels set aside for commercial television are on the 
UHF (ultra-high frequency) portion of the band, leaving twelve VHF (very-high frequency) 
channels. STAFF OF THE SENATE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, 84TH CONG., 
lsr SESS., MEMORANDUM ON TELEVISION NETWORK REGULATION AND THE UHF PROBLEM 
5 (Comm. Print 1955). 
2, Id. at 3. 
25 STAFF OF THE SENATE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, 84TH CONG., 
lsr SESS., PROGRESS REPORT ON INVESTIGATION OF TELEVISION NETWORKS AND THE UHF-VHF 
PROBLEM 6 (Comm. Print 1955). UHF stations face other technical and economic problems. 
Id. at 6-8. 
26 In 1962 the Communications Act was amended to provide the FCC with atJthority 
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VHF stations still dominate the commercial market, and, since most of these 
stations have already been allocated, means of entry of new broadcasters 
are limited as a practical matter to transfers by purchase from existing 
licensees. Therefore, hope for the improvement of television broadcasting 
must to a great extent rest on competitive forces.27 Motion pictures, news-
papers, magazines, radio, and other media of mass entertainment and in-
formation offer competition. Still, competition between television broad-
casters is important, and the entry of new individuals with new capital and 
fresh ideas into television broadcasting is critical to intramedium com-
petition. 
There exists a similar scarcity of commercial radio broadcasting fre-
quencies. There has never been a master plan for the allocation of radio 
frequencies. The FCC has promulgated a comprehensive set of general 
rules which limit the location, power, and times of transmission on radio 
frequencies throughout the country. Any person who is able to discover a 
frequency and place to transmit may apply for a license to do so.28 Never-
theless, on AM frequencies-those of greatest commercial importance-the 
desirable markets are already well covered by station licenses. Thus, trans-
fer from an existing licensee is the most convenient method of new entry. 
D. Significance of the Qualifications and Status of the Transferee 
Ordinarily, in the original grant of a station license the FCC has an 
opportunity to choose among several applicants who compete in a com-
parative hearing. The FCC disqualifies at the outset any candidate who 
fails to meet minimum character, citizenship, financial, and technical stand-
ards,29 and has stated that any applicant who appears in a comparative 
hearing would be awarded the license if he were the sole applicant.30 In 
the comparative hearing itself, the applicants are compared with respect 
to such additional factors as local ownership,31 integration of management 
to require that television receivers shipped in interstate commerce be equipped to receive 
all allocated television broadcasting frequencies. Apparatus may not be shipped in 
interstate commerce for sale or resale to the public unless it complies with FCC rules. 
Pub. L. No. 87-529, 76 Stat. 150 (1962). At about the time of this legislation, only 103 
UHF stations were in actual operation, although the FCC bas allocated space for 1,544 
UHF stations. On the other band, 500 VHF stations were in operation, although space for 
only 681 VHF stations has been allocated. S. REP. No. 1526, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1962). 
Obviously this legislation is aimed at fostering the development of UHF television, but 
it will be some years before the impact is fully felt. 
27 Station licenses are not granted in perpetuity, but must be renewed every three 
years by the FCC. Communications Act of 1934, § 307(d), 48 Stat. 1083, as amended, 47 
U.S.C. § 307(d) (1958). This provision makes broadcasters sensitive to current FCC policies, 
and probably exerts some influence on programming. 
28 An applicant for a license must show, among other things, that objectionable inter-
ference will not be caused to existing stations or that the need for the new service outweighs 
the need for the service lost by the interference. 47 C.F.R. § 3.24(b) (Cum. Supp. 1963). 
29 See Comment, 66 YALE L.J. 365, 373 (1957). 
30 E.g., Radio Wisconsin, Inc., IO P & F RADIO REcs. 1224 (1955). 
31 See, e.g., WBUD, Inc., 32 F.C.C. 915 (1962). 
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with ownership,32 diversification of control,33 and broadcasting experi-
ence.34 As noted above, the FCC does not conduct comparative hearings 
on proposed transfers, and characteristics of the proposed transferee that 
would weigh heavily against him in the context of a comparative hearing 
do not disqualify him as a transferee. Thus, whatever objectives are served 
by selection of licensees on the basis of comparative factors are frustrated 
through the transfer process.315 
Transfer has been an instrument by which multiple owners, networks, 
and owners of competing media have acquired station licenses.36 Multiple 
ownership has certainly not barred the acquisition of operating rights by 
purchase, although in a comparative hearing a multiple owner must typi-
cally overcome issues of local ownership and diversification by countering 
with broadcast experience. Multiple ownership enhances bargaining 
strength. Generally a multiple owner is in a better position than a single 
owner to procure network affiliation and syndication contracts.37 Affiliation 
with a particular network is generally limited to one per service area;38 
thus, single owners may be left to choose from less desirable affiliations. 
However, as far as the public is concerned, it seems to make little difference 
whether the station carrying the programs of a particular network is owned 
by a multiple owner or by a single owner. The FCC has proceeded directly 
by rule-making to limit multiple ownership,39 and to prevent elimination 
of competition in any individual market area.4° Further limitations on 
32 See, e.g., Radio Associates, Inc., 32 F.C.C. 166 (1962). 
83 See, e.g., Radio Wisconsin, Inc., 10 P & F RADIO REcs. 1224 (1955). 
84 See, e.g., Community Telecasting Corp., 32 F.C.C. 923 (1962). 
85 Comparative licensing has been cited as an example of a regulatory activity with 
no economic significance. Address by Professor Roger C. Cramton, American Economic 
Association Annual Meeting, December 28, 1963, to be printed in 76 AMERICAN EcoNOMIC 
AssOClATION, PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS (1964). 
36 Levin, Regulatory Efficiency, Reform and the FCC, 50 GEO. L.J. 1, 11 n.35 (1961). 
Multiple ownership is one of the problems in the general category of diversification of 
control. The main danger of multiple ownership is the possibility of misuse of economic 
power, mainly over advertisers. Ownership by persons controlling competing media, such 
as newspapers, presents broader questions of the diversification of communications media 
as a whole. Economic misuse is again a danger, but probably more important is the fear 
that such ownership leads to control of thought and opinion. Consideration of these 
questions is beyond the scope of this comment. See generally LEVIN, BROADCAST REGULATION 
AND JOINT OWNERSHIP OF MEDlA. (1960); Comment, Diversification and the Public Interest: 
Administrative Responsibility and the FCC, 66 YALE L.J. 365 (1957). 
37 Network Broadcasting Report 241-43, 564-68; STAFF OF THE SENATE COMM. ON INTER-
srATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, 84TH CONG., lsr SESS., MEMORANDUM ON TELEVISION NETWORK 
REGULATION AND THE UHF PROBLEM 39 (Comm. Print 1955). 
38 See Network Broadcasting Report 263-78. See also 47 C.F.R. § 3.132 (1958). However, 
there is necessarily some overlap. Network Broadcasting Report 216-20. 
30 A licensee may not own or control more than seven AM stations, 47 C.F.R. § 3.35(b) 
(1958), more than seven FM stations, 47 C.F.R. § 3.240(b) (1958), or more than seven 
television stations, only five of which may be on the VHF portion of the band. 47 C.F.R. 
§ 3.636(a)(2) (1958). See United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S. 192 (1956). 
40 The so-called "duopoly" rule provides that no licensee may own or control more 
than one television station in "substantially" the "same area." 47 C.F.R. § 3.636(a)(l) 
(1958). There are similar restrictions on ownership or control of AM stations, 47 C.F.R. 
§ !!.!l5(a) (1958), and FM stations, 47 C.F.R. § 3.240(a) (1958). 
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ownership, if necessary, can be imposed directly by rule and need not be 
imposed indirectly through a policy of refusing to approve transfers to 
multiple owners.41 Networks, as well as non-network multiple owners, have 
often developed their systems of owned stations by means of transfer. The 
pros and cons of network ownership have been heatedly debated without 
any clear consensus emerging.42 At any rate, it is doubtful that network 
owners supply programming of lower quality than non-network owners.43 
Multiple ownership presents problems of diversification of broad-
casting media. Other issues are raised by ownership of competing media in-
volving diversification of the media of dissemination as a whole. Owners 
of competing media have procured station licenses by means of transfer. 
However, the position of the FCC is not even definitive as to original grants 
to owners of competing media.44 Criticism of such ownership does not in-
clude any complaint that it results in inferior programming. 
E. Significa·nce of the Price Paid for Trans/ er of the License 
The public does not pay directly for the broadcasting service it re-
ceives, 45 and the FCC has no rate powers over broadcasting services. The 
basic control over the industry is the licensing function. Failure of the 
Commission to control prices of transfers has been criticized,46 perhaps 
because there is an element of windfall in each transfer of a station license 
for substantial consideration. This is truer perhaps of television than of 
radio. The right to operate a VHF television station in a large metro-
politan area is itself an extremely valuable asset. On the other hand, more 
individual broadcasting skill is generally required to develop the exchange 
value of a radio station. An important reason is that radio licenses are not 
as scarce as VHF licenses. There is also a difference in the nature of radio 
and television broadcasting. VHF television stations usually operate with 
41 But see Network Broadcasting Report 584-90; Levin, supra note 36. 
42 The arguments are summarized in Network Broadcasting Report 577-82; STAFF OF THE 
SENATE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, 85TH CONG,, 1ST SESS., THE TELEVISION 
INQUmY 89-92 (Comm. Print 1957). There are polar extremes of opinion on network 
practices generally. Compare STAFF OF THE SENATE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN 
COMMERCE, 84TH CONG., 2D SESS., THE NETWORK MONOPOLY (Comm. Print 1956) (prepared 
by Senator Bricker), with COLUMBIA BROADCASTING SYSTEM, AN ANALYSIS OF "THE NETWORK 
MONOPOLY" (1956). A very large share of total network income is derived from network-
owned stations. See 27 FCC ANN. REP. 66 (1961). 
43 See COLUMBIA BROADCASTING SYSTEM, op. cit. supra note 42, App. xxxiv-lxvi (1956) 
(relating the record for local service of four CBS-owned stations). 
44 See LEvm, op. cit. supra note 36; Network Broadcasting Report 106-24; Comment, 
66 YALE L.J. 365 (1957). If the FCC could formulate intelligent standards for comparative 
hearings regarding diversification, these same standards could be applied by rule to 
transfers in order to close the "loophole." 
45 Broadcasting revenues, of course, come mainly from the sale of advertising time. 
On the arrangements for these sales between networks and affiliated stations, see gen-
erally Network Broadcasting Report. 
46 Note, 30 IND. L.J. 351 (1955). See Hearings on the Investigation of Regulatory 
Commissions & Agencies Before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Interstate 
& Foreign Commerce, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 8, at 2908-15 (1958). 
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a network affiliation which has built-in "viewability."47 Most radio stations 
are not affiliated with a network;48 instead, programming is often geared 
to the development of a limited audience, e.g., teen-agers. A radio station 
often must seek to develop its own personality with its own shows. Thus, 
the transfer of radio stations at high prices results less in a windfall than 
does a similar transfer of a television station; radio station transfers have 
therefore attracted less attention.49 
High prices are the inevitable consequence of a limited supply when 
the market price is free to climb, and high prices stimulate "trafficking" in 
station licenses.50 However, the new Commission rules,51 if properly ap-
plied, should put an end to at least the most flagrant cases. High prices 
are likewise said to install as operators licensees bent on recovering invest-
ment through poorer service to the public.52 This is an unlikely conse-
quence. It is a fair assumption that broadcasters are businessmen, and a 
businessman maximizing his income over time must provide the service 
which will have that effect.53 The limit on poor or obnoxious service is 
service of a quality which will cause the FCC to revoke or fail to renew the 
Iicense.54 Most licensees operate well within that limit and provide service 
which attracts an audience and hence advertisers. The behavior of a li-
censee in this respect is the same regardless of the price he paid to acquire 
the station, because profit maximization is prima facie the goal of every 
licensee. The same argument applies to any contention that wealthier 
broadcasters can afford to, and do, provide better service. 
A prospective license transferee calculates the price he is willing to pay 
by capitalizing expected future income. A free market in licenses attracts 
the most economically efficient individuals to broadcasting. It is impossible 
to say that, as a class, such persons provide less satisfactory service to the 
public. The difficulties of the FCC in applying "comparative" factors tes-
tifies to the impossibility of formulating objective standards to judge future 
broadcasting performance. Probably the soundest means of assuring per-
47 STAFF OF THE SENATE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, 84TH CONG., 
lsr SESS,, INVESTIGATION OF TELEVISION NETWORKS AND THE UHF-VHF PROBLEM 20-21 
(Comm. Print 1955). 
48 In 1946, 80.8% of the AM stations in operation were affiliated with a network. Since 
1946 there has been a trend to non-affiliation, and, by 1956, only 42.7% of the AM 
stations were affiliated. Network Broadcasting Report 600-07. 
40 It has been suggested that new licenses be auctioned off, and an annual royalty 
charge for operations be collected to recapture the franchise value of broadcasting stations. 
Levin, Regulatory Efficiency, Reform and the FCC, 50 GEO. L.J. 1 (1961). See Coase, The 
Federal Communications Commission, 2 J. LAw & EcoN. I (1959). 
50 Note, 30 IND. L.J. 351, 357 (1955). 
51 See note 21 supra. 
52 SIEPMAN, RAD1o's SECOND CHANCE 165 (1946). 
153 Persons who operate stations on commercial channels will generally be forced to 
sell the license or provide income-producing programming. The scarcity value of the 
license will cause the opportunity cost to rise until non-commercial operations are no 
longer feasible. 
54 See E. G. Robinson, Jr., 33 F.C.C. 250 (1962), 47 MINN. L. REv. 465 (1963). 
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formance is a free market in licenses. And free entry is at least consistent 
with the long-standing FCC policy of encouraging entry and increasing 
competition. 55 
II. TRANSFER OF MOTOR CARRIER OPERATING RIGHTS 
Like broadcasting station licenses, motor carrier certificates and permits 
are transferred in an active market. 56 Transfer of property and operating 
rights to an existing carrier requires authorization by the ICC under section 
5(2) of the Interstate Commerce Act57 if the aggregate number of vehicles 
involved exceeds twenty.58 Transfers to non-carriers, or transfers involving 
twenty vehicles or less, are excluded from section 5,59 but transfers so ex-
cluded must, under section 212(b) of the Motor Carrier Act,60 conform to 
rules and regulations prescribed by the Commission. 61 
A. Section 212(b) Transfer Rules 
Regulations promulgated pursuant to section 212(b) apply only to 
transactions exempted from section 5. 62 The rules state that a transfer will 
generally be approved upon a showing that the proposed transferee is fit, 
willing, and able to perform the service and to conform to the act and Com-
mission rules and regulations.63 The transfer rules, however, contain a num-
ber of general bases of disapproval. These include undue division of rights 
by the transferor;64 creation of "duplicating rights" which authorize trans-
portation of passengers, or of the same commodities, between the same 
points;65 and transfer of "dormant rights," where the transferor has ceased 
operations for a substantial period of time under circumstances over which 
he had control. 66 In addition, the rules provide that a proposed transfer 
will be disapproved upon a finding that the transferee does not intend to 
engage in bona fide operations, or upon a finding that the transferor pro-
cured the rights for the purpose of profiting therefrom without engaging 
in bona fide operations.67 The Interstate Commerce Commission has es-
55 See Network Broadcasting Report 64-105. 
56 The number of applications for approval of transfer, lease, or acquisition exceeds, 
on the average, one thousand per year. See ICC, INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION 
ACTIVITIES 1937-1962, at 199 nn.1-3 (1962). Applications for transfer or lease under § 212(b) 
alone totaled 870 for fiscal 1962, and 989 for fiscal 1961. 76 ICC ANN. REP. 81 (1962). 
57 54 Stat. 905 (1940), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 5(2) (1958). 
58 Calculation of the number of vehicles involved is discussed in Hagerstown Motor 
Express Co., 87 M.C.C. 473 (1960); see 49 C.F.R. § 180.3 (1961). 
59 54 Stat. 905 (1940), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 5(10) (1958). 
60 49 Stat. 555 (1935), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 312(b) (1958). 
61 49 C.F.R. pt. 179 (1961); see United States v. Resler, 313 U.S. 57 (1941). 
62 49 C.F.R. § 179.l(a) (1961). 
63 49 C.F.R. § 179.3 (1961). 
64 49 C.F.R. § 179.5(a) (1961). 
65 49 C.F.R. § 179.5(d) (1961). 
66 49 C.F.R. § 179.5(b) (1961). 
67 49 C.F.R. § 179.5(c) (1961). 
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tablished the Transfer Board, 68 staffed by Commission employees, to handle 
the vast number of applications under 212(b), which rarely reach formal 
hearings.69 The great majority of applications under this section involve 
transferees who are not carriers.70 Thus new enterprises can and do ex-
peditiously enter the motor carrier industry. 
B. Section 5 Trans/ ers 
Transfers to existing carriers involving more than twenty vehicles are 
governed by section 5. 71 The basic statutory test for approval of such ac-
quisitions is consistency with the "public interest."72 The ICC has stated that 
cases under 212(b) do not control applications under section 5.73 Never-
theless, many of the same considerations apply. For example, the Com-
mission has denied, under section 5, transfers of dormant rights as creating 
what is in effect a "new service."74 The "public interest" as construed by 
the ICC is, in the main, the striking of a balance between the interests of 
shippers and the parties to the proposed transfer on the one hand, and the 
interests of competing carriers on the other. In McLean Trucking Co. v. 
United States,15 the Supreme Court sustained the Commission in its ap-
proval76 of the consolidation of seven large motor carriers of property into 
the largest single carrier of property in the United States. Reviewing the 
statutes, the Court concluded: 
"In short, the Commission must estimate the scope and appraise the 
effects of a curtailment of competition which will result from the 
proposed consolidation and consider them along with the advantages 
of improved service, safer operation, lower costs, etc., to determine 
whether the consolidation will assist in effectuating the overall trans-
portation policy."77 
The Court also granted the Commission broad discretion in resolving these 
considerations. 
C. End-to-End Mergers 
End-to-end mergers of routes are generally approved by the Commission 
where there has been substantial "interlining" between the parties prior 
68 See 72 ICC ANN. REP. 122 (1958). 
60 See Morton, Carrier Consolidation, 30 ICC PRAc. J. 425,437 (1963). 
70 ICC, INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION ACTIVITIES 1937-1962, at 200 (1962). 
71 See notes 57, 58 supra. 
72 Interstate Commerce Act § 5(2)(b), 54 Stat. 905 (1940), as amended, 49 U.S.C. 
§ 5(2)(b) (1958). 
73 C. H. Hubert, 45 M.C.C. 717, 725 (1947). 
74 See McFarland &: Stample Trucking Co., 36 M.C.C. 459 (1941); FULDA, CoMPEITITON 
IN THE REGULATED INDUSTRIES: TRANSPORTATION 139-42 (1961); Hearings Before the Senate 
Select Committee on Small Business on Trucking Mergers and Concentrations, 85th Cong., 
1st Sess. 280-303 (1957). 
7ri 321 U.S. 67 (1944). 
76 Associated Transp., Inc., 38 M.C.C. 137 (1942). 
77 McLean Trucking Co. v. United States, 321 U.S. 67, 87 (1944). 
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to acquisition. Interlining is a practice by a carrier of transporting property 
fo points outside his route area by arrangement with a carrier with routes 
going to the destination. Usually the arrangements provide for physical 
transfer of the goods to a truck operated by the connecting carrier, or for 
lease of the loaded truck by the connecting carrier. In a case where there 
is substantial interlining between the parties, acquisition results in better 
service to the shipper, greater economies of operation, and minimum diver-
sion of traffic from competing carriers.78 On the other hand, where there is 
substantial interlining between the acquiring carrier and carriers not par-
ties to the transaction, the Commission is reluctant to approve an acquisi-
tion which will divert the interlining traffic from the connecting carriers. 
This principle was illustrated by the Pacific Intermountain Express pro-
ceeding.79 P.I.E. was a large carrier operating between the west coast and 
Chicago and St. Louis. Keeshin, a slightly smaller carrier in terms of reve-
nue, operated between the midwest and points east. The two firms involved 
had little interchange traffic; in fact, P.I.E. interlined most of its freight 
with Keeshin's competitors in the east. Twelve motor carriers and several 
railroads appeared in opposition to approval. The Commission denied the 
application for approval of the acquisition, stating that the proposal "goes 
beyond a mere unification of the operations of two going concerns, with 
the elimination of interchange formerly carried on between them."80 It 
would create a "new service" depriving existing carriers of transport and 
interchange now carried. 81 The outcome of later cases before the Commis-
sion seems to have hinged on the success of competitors in convincing the 
Commission of the adverse effects upon them which would result from the 
proposed acquisition.82 The support of shippers for the transaction is sim-
ilarly important in obtaining approval.83 
D. Mergers of Routes Within an Area 
Mergers between carriers operating in the same general area are less 
common than end-to-end mergers and present a somewhat different prob-
lem.84 Such a merger cannot offer the advantages of the elimination of in-
terchange traffic, and it would tend to depress the competitive level by 
eliminating a competitor in the area. Where the transaction involves com-
mon control of competing carriers, the Commission is reluctant to approve 
the application, often referring to a policy of corporate simplification and 
to adverse effects of interlocking interests on competition.85 However, when 
78 See J. W. Ringsby, 58 M.C.C. 594 (1952). 
79 57 M.C.C. 341 (1950), afj'd on reconsideration, 57 M.C.C. 467 (1951). 
80 Pacific Intermountain Express Co., 57 M.C.C. 341, 379 (1950). 
81 Id. at 380. 
82 See Navajo Freight Lines, Inc. v. United States, 186 F. Supp. 377 (D. Colo. 1960), 
109 U. PA. L. R.Ev. 892 (1961); FULDA, op. cit. supra note 74, at 166 n.D (1961) (collecting 
cases). 
83 Id. at 132-33. 
84 Id. at 142. 
85 See W. W. Brown, 39 M.C.C. 373 at 377 (1943). 
1964] COMMENTS 1027 
the transaction involves a simple merger or purchase, the problem is gen-
erally resolved by application of the general criteria outlined in the 
McLean Trucking case.sa 
E. Significance of the Price Paid for the Trans/ er of Operating Rights 
The ICC has recognized that the price to be paid for any proposed 
transfer is a relevant factor in determining whether the transaction is in 
the "public interest."87 In its capacity as overseer of the health of the in-
dustry, the ICC is concerned with the financial integrity of the carriers 
under its jurisdiction. Therefore, when the Commission feels that the price 
will overtax the resources of the acquiring carrier, the application is de-
nied. 88 The problem of the financial integrity of the acquiring carrier can 
be mitigated by a showing of sounder route integration, prospective econ-
omies of operation, and other indicators of increased future efficiency.89 
In addition, the Commission is concerned with the medium of payment as 
well as the amount.DO 
Shippers pay directly for the service provided, and the ICC has the duty 
of supervising the setting of "just and reasonable" rates by the carriers.91 
The Commission has shown some, but very little, concern over the possible 
consequences the purchase price may have on rates.92 Perhaps this is a re-
flection of the highly competitive nature of the trucking business. There 
is a great deal of competition between truckers, and from other modes of 
transportation, principally rail and water carriers.93 Rate control is often 
directed toward the maintenance of minimum rather than maximum rates.94 
Because of the tendency of truckers to cut rates and the general availability 
of competitive service, shippers are not in great danger of having the price 
of an acquisition passed on to them.95 The price agreed upon by the parties 
86 See text accompanying note 75 supra. 
87 E.g., DeCamp Bus Lines, 58 M.C.C. 667 (1952); see Meck & Bogue, Federal Regula-
tion of Motor Carrier Unification, 50 YALE L.J. 1376, 1397-404 (1941). 
88 See Keeshin Transcontinental Freight Lines, Inc., 5 M.C.C. 25 (1937). 
80 See Meck & Bogue, supra note 87, at 1399. 
90 Section 5(2)(c) of the Interstate Commerce Act directs the Commission to give 
weight to the total fixed charges resulting from the transaction. 54 Stat. 905 (1940), 49 
U.S.C. § 5(2)(c) (1958). 
91 It is the duty of every common carrier to set "just and reasonable" rates. Motor 
Carrier Act §§ 216(a), 216(b), 49 Stat. 558 (1935), 49 U.S.C. §§ 316(a), 316(b) (1958). The 
Commission determines "lawful" rates. Motor Carrier Act § 216(e), 49 Stat. 558 (1935), 49 
U.S.C. § 316(e) (1958). 
92 Graves Truck Line, Inc., 59 M.C.C. 371, 375 (1953). But see Middlewest Freightways, 
Inc., 58 M.C.C. 647 (1952). 
93 Williams, The ICC and the Regulation of Intercarrier Competition, 63 HARv. L. 
REv. 1349 (1950). 
u Hale & Hale, Competition or Control III: Motor Carriers, 108 U. PA. L. REv. 775, 
814-15 (1960); see Note, Minimum Rate Regulation by the Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion, 73 HARv. L. REv. 762 (1960). 
95 A different situation prevails where the route transferred does not offer competitive 
service, or where the transfer eliminates competitive service. The Commission, however, 
has not adopted a distinction along these lines. 
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to the transfer is generally entitled to great weight and is ordinarily ac-
cepted as representing the "reasonable commercial value" of the properties 
and operations involved.96 Only prices which are "excessive"97 or incon-
sistent with "careful trading"98 are disapproved. Although the Commission's 
position on the valuation of intangible properties is not plain, it is clear 
that such intangibles, including operating rights, are entitled to be included 
in the fixing of an exchange value.99 
Compared to the investment of railroads and water carriers in tangible 
property, that of a motor carrier is small. Intangible property, chiefly op-
erating rights, is relatively more important to the total value of a carrier's 
business.100 The Commission plainly feels that strict control of the price of 
intangibles would discourage otherwise desirable transfers;101 thus it is re-
luctant to disapprove a transfer merely because of price. The motor carrier 
industry is characterized by a great mass of routes which are often limited 
by inefficient restrictions and are not necessarily well integrated.102 Much 
can be done through voluntary transfer of routes to improve the present 
route structure and to shift the route structure to meet changing transporta-
tion needs. A permissive Commission attitude toward transfers fosters these 
objectives. 
III. TRANSFER OF AIRLINE ROUTE AUTHORIZATIONS 
Air carrier certificates and permits have not been as freely exchanged as 
broadcasting licenses and motor carrier authorizations. Section 40l(h) of 
the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 provides that no certificate of public con-
venience and necessity may be transferred without approval of the CAB.103 
Consolidation, merger, or other transfer of tangible assets likewise requires 
approval of the Board under section 408(a) of the act.104 For transactions 
involving transfers of tangible assets a formal hearing is required by 
statute.105 Because most transfers of routes have involved transfer of 
physical assets in the same transaction, a formal hearing is typical. The 
standard both for transfer of certificate and for transfer of property is con-
sistency with the "public interest." The act indicates that, for approval of 
the· transfer of routes, consistency with the public.interest must appear 
affirmatively, whereas, for transfer of assets, approval will be given except 
96 See, e.g., Transport Co., 36 M.C.C. 61, 90 (1940). 
97 Ibid. 
98 Keeshin Transcontinental Freight Lines, Inc., 5 M.C.C. 25 (1937). 
99 See, e.g., Lee Transp. Co., 13 FED. CAR. CAs. 40306 (ICC 1958). 
100 Meck&: Bogue, supra note 87, at 1398. 
101 See William M. Graves, 59 M.C.C. 60 (1953); Southeastern Greyhound Lines, 55 
M.C.C. 543 (1949). 
102 See FuLDA, op. dt. supra note 74, at 92-105. 
103 72 Stat. 756, 49 U.S.C. § 137l(h) (1958) (formerly Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, 
§ 401(i), 52 Stat. 977). 
104 72 Stat. 767, 49 U.S.C. § 1378(a) (1958). 
105 Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 408(b), 72 Stat. 767, 49 U.S.C. § 1378(b) (1958). 
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upon a finding that the transaction is inconsistent with the public interest. 
However, this distinction has not been treated as significant by the Board.106 
The present domestic route structure is a conglomeration of original 
"grandfather" routes and various routes added by the CAB since 1938 as 
need for them developed. This has not resulted in the creation of an ideal 
system.107 The Board may alter the route structure through new or addi-
tional route certifications, and through refusal to renew temporary certifi-
cates, for which re-application must be made. In addition, the CAB has 
authority to modify or suspend any certificate if the "public convenience 
and necessity so require,"108 as well as the power to revoke certificates for 
intentional failure to comply with Board orders or regulations.109 The 
power to suspend has been used sparingly against carriers reluctant to give 
up their routes,11° and, because of procedural limitations, it cannot be con-
sidered an expeditious method of realigning the route structure. Further• 
more, the Board has no power to order mergers, consolidations, or transfers 
of routes.111 Thus the ability of carriers to transfer routes under the super-
vision of the Board is an important means of promoting a sound airline 
system. 
The Board has passed on a number of cases where the consideration for 
the transfer approximately equaled the value of the tangible assets ac-
quired. In such cases, the Board has focused on a number of public interest 
factors, not unlike those applied by the ICC. Of course, the buyer must be 
fit, willing, and able to provide the service.112 Beyond that, the Board has 
considered the interest of the travelling public in the quality of the service 
to be provided113 and the economic interest of competing carriers.114 Al-
ways present is the issue of whether the route soundly integrates with the 
routes of the acquiring carrier.rns None of the above factors is necessarily 
106 Byers Ahways, Inc., 23 C.A.B. 428 (1956). 
101 See Landis, Air Routes Under the Civil Aeronautics Act, 15 J. AIR. L. &: CoM. 295 
(1948). 
10s Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 40l(g), 72 Stat. 756, 49 U.S.C. § 137I(g) (1958). 
100 Ibid. 
110 In New England Air Express, Inc., 14 C.A.B. 1132 (1951), a supplemental air 
carrier lost its letter of registration (supplementals are not issued certificates) for 
"complete disregard" of the rights and welfare of the traveling public. For the difficulties 
of altering certificates, see CAB v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 367 U.S. 316 (1961). On the 
power to suspend, see United Air Lines, Inc. v. CAB, 198 F.2d 100 (7th Cir. 1952). 
111 United Airlines, Inc., 8 C.A.B. 298 (1947). The same applies to surface carriers 
under the jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce Commission. Morton, Carrier Con-
solidation, 30 ICC PRAC. J. 425, 444 (1963). 
112 Alaska Island Airlines, Inc., 9 C.A.B. 14 (1947). The Board also considers whether 
the transfer will result in a waste of the transferee's assets. Wien Alaska Airlines, 3 C.A.B. 
207 (1941); see Thomas E. Gordon, 7 C.A.B. 429 (1946). 
113 Wien Alaska Airlines, 3 C.A.B. 207 (1941). The ability of the seller to operate the 
route will also be considered. Alaska Island Airlines, Inc., 9 C.A.B. 14 (1947). 
IH Cordova Air Serv., Inc., 4 C.A.B. 708 (1944). 
1111 See Ferguson Airways, Inc., 7 C.A.B. 769 (1947); Western Airlines, Inc., 4 C.A.B. 654 
(1944); cf. Southwest-W. Coast Merger Case, 14 C.A.B. 356 (1951). Other factors are 
whether the transfer frustrates the purpose of the original grant, Resort Airlines, Inc., 
IA Av. L. REP. ,I21214 (CAB 1961), and whether the type of route is consistent with the 
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determinative of a particular application, nor is there any known limit to 
the issues· which may be relevant to a particular transaction. The broad 
range of public interest factors which may enter into the determination 
often appears in other cases before the Board, such as original certification 
cases and renewal cases. By applying the relevant factors to transfer cases, 
the Board may assure that transfers will further Board policies rather than 
subvert them. 
Since passengers and shippers pay directly for the service provided, the 
CAB regulates the rates of carriers under its jurisdiction,116 and several 
carriers receive subsidies from the federal government,117 the Board must 
direct its attention to the price to be paid to determine whether a trans-
action is in the public interest. Early in its history the CAB evolved three 
basic principles: (1) operating rights and other intangibles have an ex-
change value; (2) the CAB will scrutinize the reasonableness of the con-
sideration; and (3) the portion of the purchase price which exceeds the 
value of the tangible assets transferred cannot be added to the investment 
base for purposes of rate or mail pay detertninations. With minor varia-
tions, the Board has applied these general principles to all transfer cases. 
The first major case to come before the Board was Acquisition of 
Marquette by TWA in 1940.118 The purchase price of 473,000 dollars was 
about fifteen times the value of the assets involved. In refusing to approve 
transfer of the certificate, the Board stated: "it would clearly be adverse to 
the public interest ... to allow a certificate of public convenience and ne-
cessity to be treated as if it were a speculative security, to be sold by the 
holder to the highest bidder .... "119 Shortly thereafter, in the Second 
Marquette Case,120 the Board withdrew its harsh language. The price had 
been reduced to 313,000 dollars, ten times the value of the assets, and the 
transfer was approved.121 The Board stated: "Further reflection on the 
issues raised in this proceeding leads us to the conclusion that in passing 
on the reasonableness of the price the Board should take into consideration 
all types of value which are in fact elements in the fixing of the exchange 
value of the property.''122 This statement paved the way for the celebrated 
United-Western case.12a 
United had no route directly connecting Los Angeles with the East. 
operations of the acquiring carrier, Eastern-Mohawk Transfer Case, IA Av. L. REP. 1!21200 
(CAB 1961). 
116 See Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 1002(g), 72 Stat. 790, 49 U.S.C. § 1482(g) (1958). 
117 See note 139 infra and accompanying text. 
118 2 C.A.B. I (1940). 
119 Id. at 14. 
120 Acquisition of Marquette by TWA-Supplemental Opinion, 2 C.A.B. 409 (1940); 
see Note, 61 HARv. L. REv. 523 (1948). 
121 Chairman Landis dissented. 
122 Acquisition of Marquette by TWA-Supplemental Opinion, 2 C.A.B. 409, 412 
(1940). 
123 United-Western, Acquisition of Air Carrier Property, 8 C.A.B. 298 (1947); see Note, 
48 COLUM. L. REY. 88 (1948); Note, 15 u. CHI. L. REv. 343 (1948). 
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United did have routes connecting Denver and the East, and Western's 
Denver-Los Angeles route provided a convenient hookup to Los Angeles 
for United's transcontinental traffic. In 1940, United's attempt to merge 
with Western was thwarted by the Board. The CAB felt that it was in the 
public interest to preserve Western as an independent carrier in the West.124 
In 1944 the route involved in the sale in question was awarded to West-
ern.125 United was a competing applicant for the route, and was again 
frustrated in its attempt to gain direct access to Los Angeles. The principal 
reason for denying United's application was that traffic carried on Western's 
Salt Lake City-Los Angeles route would be diverted by the award of the 
Denver route to United because much of the traffic that Western carried was 
interchange traffic with United's transcontinental passengers, and the pres-
ervation of Western as a strong independent carrier was in the public in-
terest. Then, in 1947, United arranged to pay Western 3.75 million dollars 
for its Denver-Los Angeles route, along with less than two million dollars 
worth of equipment. This transfer was approved by the Board.126 The obvi-
ous conclusion is that United paid nearly two million dollars to avoid the 
impact of earlier Board decisions.127 
In decisions subsequent to United-Western, the Board has approved 
transfers where the value of intangibles could be calculated as 338,000 
dollars (64.4 percent of the total price of the transaction),128 3,012,000 
dollars (30.0 percent of the total),129 390,000 dollars,130 and 480,000 dollars 
(96.0 percent of the total).131 In one case, the Board approved a sale of 
routes and certificates unaccompanied by physical assets at a price of 
25,000 dollars.132 Plainly, the CAB has recognized the exchange value of 
route authorizations, but in almost every case the Board has closely ex-
amined the reasonableness of price and in general has not felt the approval 
of price is a routine matter. In National-Caribbean-Atlantic Control133 
the Board refused to approve the acquisition of Caribbean by National 
for stock worth 325,000 dollars when the net worth of Caribbean did not 
exceed 60,000 dollars. It stated: "We are convinced that an excessive price 
paid by an air carrier, in one form or another and in the long run, comes 
out of the pockets of the travelling and investing public."134 In the TWA, 
124 United Air Lines Transp. Corp., 1 C.A.A. 739 (1940). 
125 Western Air Lines, 6 C.A.B. 199 (1944). 
126 United-Western, Acquisition of Air Carrier Property, 8 C.A.B. 298 (1947). 
121 However, several months prior to the decision in the United-Western case, the 
Board authorized United to fly between Los Angeles and Chicago and points east. Trans-
continental &: W. Air, 8 C.A.B. 28 (1947). This would seem not only to moot the diversion 
issue, but also to achieve United's main purpose for acquiring 'iVestern's route. 
128 West Coast-Empire Merger Case, 15 C.A.B. 971 (1952). 
129 Delta-Chicago &: So. Merger Case, 16 C.A.B. 647 (1952). 
130 Continental-Pioneer Acquisition Case, 20 C.A.B. 323 (1955). The price of the 
tangibles involved was not disclosed in the report. 
131 Mackey-Midet Acquisition Case, 24 C.A.B. 51 (1956). 
132 Byers Airways, Inc., 23 C.A.B. 428 (1956). 
133 6 C.A.B. 671 (1946). 
134 National-Caribbean-Atlantic Control, 6 C.A.B. 671, 682 (1946). In an earlier case, 
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Route 38 case the CAB harshly criticized TWA for attempting to sell the 
certificate for an unprofitable route to a local carrier for 100,000 dollars.1811 
In 1958, TWA was again the victim as the Board refused to approve the 
sale of the Cincinnati-Detroit route to a local carrier for 310,000 dollars.136 
Thus, there are limits to the tolerance of the CAB in approving transfers. 
The Board has had a longstanding policy of encouraging improvement 
of the route system through voluntary transfer of certificates.137 The Board 
has felt that failure to allow an exchange value to be placed on route cer-
tificates would undermine the implementation of this policy.138 Sound as 
these propositions may be, there remains the question of who pays the 
ultimate price for transfer of certificates which are originally issued for the 
"public convenience and necessity." At the outset, a distinction must be 
drawn between subsidized and non-subsidized carriers. At present, all "local 
service" carriers are on subsidy, whereas only one "trunkline" carrier re-
ceives a direct subsidy from the government.139 Prior to 1961, local service 
carriers often had an incentive to lower rates to appeal to a greater market 
in order to enlarge their investment and thereby their subsidy. The main 
focus of rate regulation was to maintain rates at a sound level to keep the 
subsidy within reasonable bounds, since the subsidy was determined on 
the basis of the individual needs of the carrier involved.140 Businessmen 
do not invest without expectation of profit, and, if the price paid is a sound 
investment, a return must come from (I) the travelling public through 
Mayflower Airlines, Inc., 4 C.A.B. 680 (1944), the Board refused to approve an acquisition 
of operating routes and assets worth $8,300 for a price of $17,500, stating that "the sale 
of certificates at inflated prices is inconsistent with the public interest and is not conducive 
to the maintenance and development of an economically sound air transportation system." 
Id. at 684. However, in a supplemental decision the Board relented and allowed the 
purchase for $17,500. Mayflower Airlines, Inc., 6 C.A.B. 139 (1944). 
135 Transcontinental &: W. Air, Inc., 10 C.A.B. 455 (1949). 
136 Trans World Airlines, Inc., 27 C.A.B. 440 (1958). 
137 See West Coast-Empire Merger Case, 15 C.A.B. 971, 973 (1952); Southwest-W. 
Coast Merger Case, 14 C.A.B. 356, 357 (1951). In one case the Board suggested that TWA 
transfer an unprofitable route to a local service carrier. Additional California-Nevada 
Service, 10 C.A.B. 405 (1949). TWA did so but attached a right of reverter and a restraint 
on alienation. The Board reluctantly approved the transfer. Bonanza Air Lines, Inc., 10 
C.A.B. 873 (1949). A majority of the Board has never discussed the meaning of § 40l(i) 
of the Federal Aviation Act, which provides that no certificate shall confer any "proprie-
tary" or "property" right in the use of any air space. 
138 In the Continental-Pioneer Acquisition Case, 20 C.A.B. 323 (1955), the Board 
decided not to charge Pioneer's profit from the transaction against its final mail pay 
because the deal would become "unattractive" to Pioneer. In Western Air Lines, Inc. v. 
CAB, 347 U.S. 67 (1954), the Supreme Court held that the CAB must include profit from 
sales of routes in the computation of mail pay. This case involved Western's profit from 
the 1948 sale to United, which the Board had excluded from the computation in order 
to encourage other voluntary route transfers. The Postmaster General, however, was 
unwilling to pay. 
139 Northeast Airlines, a "grandfather" carrier, has long been in financial trouble. 
In 1963 the Board refused to renew Northeast's certification on the New York-Miami run, 
New York-Florida Renewal Case, IA Av. L. REP. 1121396 (CAB 1963), and put Northeast 
back on subsidy. CCH Av. L. REP. Newsletter No. 326, Sept. 27, 1963, p. 4. 
140 See Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Summerfield, 347 U.S. 74 (1954). 
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higher rates, (2) the general public through a higher subsidy, or (3) op-
erating economies resulting from the creation of a sounder economic unit. 
Seemingly aware of these problems, the CAB has been reluctant, as in the 
TWA transfer cases, to approve the sale of certificates to local service car-
riers at high prices. Often, approval of the transfer has required a showing 
of significant savings by means of economy of operations.141 In 1961, the 
CAB instituted class rates for the award of subsidies to local carriers.142 
One of the avowed purposes was to create an incentive to charge higher 
rates,143 taking some pressure off the subsidy payments. Nevertheless, the 
problem of keeping the price paid from being passed on to passengers and 
shippers is more acute. Since the incentive now is to raise rates, the CAB 
must be as diligent in scrutinizing rate increases as it must be in requiring 
proof of the prospective economies of a proposed transfer. 
Transfer of certificates to non-subsidized trunklines presents a some-
what different problem. Trunklines cannot expect to recover the price 
through government subsidy; so they must look to profit through better 
operation of the route, or through the greater efficiency of a better in-
tegrated route system. If the route transferred is highly competitive, con-
cern over the transfer price is at a minimum. The acquiring carrier will 
have to match the rates of competing airlines. In this way, the transfer 
price cannot be directly passed on to the travelling public through higher 
rates;144 it must be made up through more efficient operation. On the other 
hand, if there is no competing service on the route transferred, the purchase 
price may be passed on to the public directly by higher rates. However, this 
possibility may be minimized by diligent rate regulation, and by the in-
sistence of the Board that, at least to a certain extent, the purchase price of 
certificates be justified by prospective operating efficiencies. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The policies of the FCC and ICC on transfer applications have not 
hindered the entry, or rather the substitution, of new competition. How-
ever, transfer of certificates has not been a significant means of entry into 
the business of air carriage. No new air carrier has so entered.145 Over 
the years, the number of original "grandfather" air carriers, which are 
the trunkline carriers, has diminished from eighteen to only eleven. At the 
141 See, e.g., Continental-Pioneer Acquisition Case, 20 C.A.B. 323 (1955). 
142 The subsidy which each carrier receives is based on available seat-miles flown, 
but the rate per seat-mile varies inversely with the density of operations expressed in terms 
of revenue plane-miles per station per day. Local Service Class Subsidy Rate Investigation, 
IA Av. L. REP. ,I2II34 (CAB 1961). 
143 Id. at 14455. 
144 This conclusion is somewhat weakened by the fact that airlines are in oligopolistic 
competition, with only a few carriers over most competitive routes. See CAVES, Am. TRANS· 
PORT AND rrs REGULATORS 356-77 (1962). 
145 But see R. D. Fenno, II C.A.B. 1029 (1950). Changes in the form of business organi-
zation have been approved. Turner Airlines, Inc., 10 C.A.B. 695 (1949). 
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same time, no non-grandfather carrier has been certified to operate over the 
better trunkline routes.146 This diminution of the number of trunkline 
carriers is but one consequence of the Board's solicitous attitude toward 
the health of existing trunklines.147 Perhaps airlines are unwilling to sell 
their routes to prospective purchasers, but CAB general policies on entry 
of new carriers have no doubt discouraged any attempt to enter air carriage 
by transfer of routes. This result, if unfortunate, is at least consistent. 
With respect to the entry of established firms into new markets, the 
policies of the ICC and the CAB do not differ radically. Both agencies have 
duties to promote the well-being of the industries they regulate,148 and thus 
are always interested in the effects of a proposed transfer on competing 
carriers. On the other hand, the promotional duties of the FCC are some-
what less distinct; and the history of radio and television broadcasting has 
not been characterized by financial difficulties resulting from "destructive" 
competition.149 It is not surprising, therefore, that the only effective limita-
tions on the expansion of broadcasters through purchase of other licenses 
are the multiple ownership rules coupled with the "duopoly" rules.1150 The 
FCC does not consider the effects on competitors to be an important factor 
in passing on applications for transfers.1111 
It is in regard to the price to be paid that the contrast among the re-
spective policies of the three agencies is most distinct. The FCC makes no at-
tempt to control the price of transfer. The public does not pay directly for 
the service provided, nor is any question of subsidy involved. On the other 
hand, the ICC is reluctant to approve transfer at a price well beyond the 
value of the tangible assets involved. Most often, this reluctance is rooted, 
at least ostensibly, in the willingness of the ICC to second-guess carrier 
management as to the advisability of the price to be paid. Less often per-
haps, the ICC is concerned lest a large investment in routes be reflected 
in higher rates, for trucking is a highly competitive business, and this tends 
to minimize chances of a direct passing-on of the price to shippers through 
higher rates. The CAB is probably more careful than the ICC about ap-
proval of transfer price. The subsidy problem has been partly responsible, 
but more important is the greater danger of higher rates. The impetus for 
146 But see Cincinnati-Detroit Route Suspension Investigation, 31 C.A.B. 63 (1960). 
141 See generally RICHMOND, REGULATION AND COMPETITION IN AIR TRANSPORTATION 
(1961). 
148 Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 102(a), 72 Stat. 740, 49 U.S.C. § 1302(a) (1958); 
Declaration of the National Transportation Policy, 54 Stat. 899 (1940), 49 U.S.C. preceding 
§ 1 (1958). 
149 The tendencies of thought which the use of the term "destructive competition" 
implies were significant in the passage of both the Motor Carrier Act and the Civil 
Aeronautics Act. See FULDA, COMPETITION IN THE REGULATED INDUSTRIES: TRANSPORTATION 
7-23 (1961 ). 
150 See notes 41, 42 supra. 
151 See Camden Radio, Inc., 9 P & F RADIO REcs. 359 (1953), rev'd, 220 F.2d 191 
(D.C. Cir. 1954); cf. Southeastern Enterprises, 22 F.C.C. 605 (1957). See also 22 FCC ANN. 
REP. ll3 (1956). 
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rate changes comes from the airlines, with the CAB controlling changes 
principally through its power to suspend new tariffs.152 Most trunkline 
routes offer competitive service,153 which inhibits a carrier's raising of rates. 
Competition for passenger traffic also comes from railroads, buses, and 
private automobiles. However, airline rates are substantially higher,154 and 
thus airline rates are not particularly responsive to competition from other 
modes of passenger transportation. Competitive controls over airline rates 
must come principally from other air carriers, and in an oligopolistic set-
ting, the airlines have not been vigorous in price competition. The dangers 
of higher rates, or the lack of initiative to lower rates, is greater in regard 
to airlines than in regard to truckers. It is therefore to be expected that the 
CAB would be more sensitive than the ICC to the purchase prices paid 
for routes. 
Alexander E. Bennett 
152 Federal Aviation .Act of 1958, § 102(g), 72 Stat. 790, 49 U.S.C. § 1482(g) (1958). 
lli3 See MEYER, P.ECK, STENASON &: ZWICK, COMPETITION IN THE TRANSPORTATION 
INDUSTRI.ES 229 (1960). 
154 See 23 AIR TRANSPORT AssocIATION OF .AMERICA, FACTS AND FIGURES ABOUT AIR 
TRANSPORTATION 10 (1962). 
